Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover by Anderson, Ronald et al.
Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover∗
Ronald W. Anderson†, M. Cecilia Bustamante‡and Ste´phane Guibaud§
December 2, 2013
Abstract
We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard in a firm subject to stochastic
growth opportunities. In our model, managers are dismissed after poor performance, but also
when an alternative manager is better able to grow the firm. The optimal contract may involve
managerial entrenchment, such that growth opportunities are foregone after good performance.
Firms with better growth prospects have higher managerial turnover and more front-loaded
compensation. The use of golden parachutes is suboptimal, unless the firm needs to incentivize
its managers to truthfully report the arrival of growth opportunities. By ignoring the externality
of the dismissal policy onto future managers, the optimal contract may imply excessive retention.
1 Introduction
Firms derive value not only from operating their assets in place, but also from their ability to
exploit growth opportunities. The latter source of value creation often involves major transforma-
tions of the firm— such as adopting innovative production techniques, changing the organization
of labor, developing new products, or venturing into new markets. However incumbent managers
may lack the vision or skills necessary to implement these transformations and lead their firm
through a new, more profitable phase. In such circumstances, a change of management is needed
for the firm to successfully pursue its growth opportunities.
This paper introduces growth-induced managerial turnover in a dynamic moral hazard model
of the firm. As in previous studies on optimal long-term managerial contracts with limited lia-
bility, firms use early termination as a disciplinary device— and managers are replaced following
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poor performance. But in contrast with previous studies, firms may also fire their managers de-
spite good performance when a change of management is the best or only option to seize a growth
opportunity. We characterize how growth-induced turnover affects the provision of managerial
incentives and analyze the determinants of realized firm growth.
In our model, a risk-neutral manager is hired by a risk neutral, long-lived firm. Cash flows
are only observable by the manager, who can divert them for his own private benefit. The firm
can fire its current manager at any point in time, and replace him at a cost. Take-it-or-leave-it
growth opportunities may arrive stochastically in any period. In our baseline model, the arrival
of a growth opportunity is contractible and the firm needs to hire a new manager in order to
pursue such an opportunity. If the firm decides to take up a growth opportunity, it pays the costs
associated with replacing the manager and transforming the firm— possibly but not necessarily
including capital investment— and its profitability increases.
We solve for the optimal long-term contracts signed between the firm and its successive
managers at the time they are hired. A manager’s expected discounted payoff under the optimal
contract (often referred to as the manager’s promise) evolves over time in response both to
cashflow and growth opportunity realizations. Replacement and compensation decisions are
determined by endogenous performance thresholds. A key feature of our analysis is that the
continuation value of the firm upon replacing a manager is endogenous (equal to the value
of the firm under the newly hired manager), and contingent on the availability of a growth
opportunity. This contrasts with most of the existing dynamic contracting models where, upon
firing the manager, the firm obtains an exogenously given liquidation value.
Our results in the baseline model are as follows. First, we characterize turnover. The prob-
ability of replacing an incumbent manager depends not only on past and current performance,
as summarized by the manager’s promise, but also on the availability of a growth opportunity.
The conditional probability of managerial turnover is always higher in states of the world where
a growth opportunity is available. However a firm may in some circumstances decide to retain
its incumbent manager despite the arrival of a growth opportunity. Firms facing only modest
growth opportunities or those plagued with severe agency problems optimally choose to do so
when a growth opportunity arises after a period of good performance. The optimal contract can
therefore involve a particular form of managerial entrenchment. When it occurs, forsaken growth
adds to the usual inefficiency that, for ex ante incentive provision, managers can be fired upon
poor past performance in the absence of a growth opportunity.
Second, we characterize the optimal compensation scheme, and determine how growth oppor-
tunities affect managerial compensation. We find that the optimal managerial contract is readily
implementable by a system of deferred compensation credit and bonuses. Deferred compensation
is used, along with the threat of inefficient replacement, in order to provide incentives in the best
possible way. We show that the degree to which firms rely on back-loading of compensation is
affected by their growth prospects. Namely, the extent of back-loading decreases with the quality
of firms’ growth opportunities. We also find that severance is not required under the optimal
contract when the arrival of growth opportunities is verifiable. It is more efficient for the firm,
in order to mitigate agency costs, to give zero severance to a departing manager and instead
increase the manager’s promise contingent on him being retained.
Third, realized firm growth depends both on the features of the exogenous growth process
and on the severity of moral hazard. We distinguish between two endogenous types of firms:
high growth firms that undertake all growth opportunities, and low growth firms that may forego
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some growth opportunities depending upon the incumbent manager’s past performance. In our
model, two firms with similar growth opportunities may end up having very different realized
growth profiles just because they differ in the severity of the agency problem they face. Thus we
find for example that improvements in a firm’s corporate governance can transform a firm with
given technology and growth opportunities from a low growth firm into a high growth firm.
Lastly, we identify a new component of agency costs that arises in our framework, which is
due to a form of contractual externality. We decompose the firm value into the value of present
and future payments to the principal, to the current manager and to all the future managers.
When a firm negotiates a contract with an incoming manager, it maximizes the sum of the first
two components. It fails to take into account the spillover effect upon the expected amount of
time before hiring future managers and thus the present value of compensation received by all
future managers. This may result in excessive managerial retention relative to the constrained
optimal contract. The agency cost induced by this externality is larger for low growth firms,
where the arrival of a growth opportunity does not always result in managerial turnover. This
externality of the current binding contracts of the firm on its future binding contracts does not
arise in earlier papers in the literature, in which firms are liquidated at an exogenous value upon
termination of the incumbent, and only, manager of the firm.
We consider two extensions of the baseline model. First, we consider a setting where the ar-
rival of growth opportunities is only observable by the incumbent manager. Under the maintained
assumption that growth entails a change of management, the incumbent must be incentivized to
truthfully reveal to the firm the realization of a growth opportunity. When the quality of growth
opportunities is good enough, the manager is systematically dismissed when he announces that
such opportunity becomes available, and he receives a severance pay contingent on the firm’s
performance history under his tenure— in stark contrast with the no-severance result that arises
when growth opportunities are contractible. Our framework therefore suggests a possible expla-
nation for the widespread use of severance, as a way to assure the goodwill of the incumbent
and incentivize him to not bury the news that value-enhancing transformations of the firm have
become available when such news may lead to his dismissal.
In another extension, we consider an environment where firms can grow with their incumbent
managers, possibly at a different cost than when they grow with a new manager. When growing
with the incumbent manager is very costly, e.g., because realizing a growth opportunity would
require paying an army of external consultants to help the firm reinvent itself, all the results
of the baseline model survive. However, when the costs of growing with the incumbent are
sufficiently low, the incumbent may grow the firm, but only if his past performance has been
sufficiently good. If instead past performance has been poor, the incumbent will be dismissed,
even though this is ex post inefficient.
Our paper contributes to a recent body of work that applies the tools of optimal dynamic con-
tracting to the study of the firm in the presence of agency conflicts. Quadrini (2004), Clementi
and Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a), Biais et al. (2010), DeMarzo et al.
(2011), and Philippon and Sannikov (2011) explore, as we do, the link between dynamic moral
hazard and firm growth when growth is contractible.1 Our framework differs in several dimen-
1The extension of our model with privately observed growth opportunities, analyzed in Section 6, is related to
He (2008) and Malenko (2012). He (2008) considers an environment where cashflow growth is directly affected by
non-observable effort from the manager. Malenko (2012) solves for the optimal investment and auditing policies when
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sions. A key difference is that in these papers a firm always grows with its incumbent manager
whereas we put ‘growth-induced’ turnover, i.e., the idea that a change of management may be a
pre-requisite for growth, at center stage. Furthermore, we consider growth opportunities which
arrive stochastically, we endogenize the state-contingent ‘liquidation’ value of the firm, and focus
on managerial turnover rather than firm survival. Finally, our interpretation of growth is slightly
different— growth in our framework may take place simply through strategic or organizational
change without changes in fixed or working capital. Spear and Wang (2005) and Garrett and
Pavan (2012) study optimal termination policies in settings where the firm can dismiss their
manager and hire a new one from an external labor market, but they abstract from growth and
the economic determinants of turnover they emphasize are different from the ones in our paper.
Our notion that the growth of a firm may require replacing the incumbent manager is found in
many early contributions to the managerial theory of the firm. Penrose (1959) discusses why firms
may operate successfully under competent managers but may still fail to take full advantage of
their opportunities of expansion. Williamson (1966) elaborates on how management constraints
affect the realized growth of firms. More recently, Roberts (2004) echoes Penrose by emphasizing
the need for different organizational capabilities in the exploration and exploitation of firms’
investment projects. He discusses a number of business cases where this effect is prominent. In a
repeated moral hazard framework but without optimal contracting, Anderson and Nyborg (2011)
study the link between managerial replacement and firm growth and show how it is affected by
the firm’s choice of debt or equity financing. The idea that firms may need different managers at
different times is also present in recent theoretical work on managerial turnover by Eisfeldt and
Kuhnen (2012), although not in the specific context of firm growth. They consider a competitive
matching model without agency conflicts to explore the role of industry conditions in determining
managerial turnover, managerial compensation and the type of CEOs being hired.
The implications of our model are related to the empirical literature on managerial turnover
and compensation. In the context of venture capital, Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg (2009)
provide evidence that the management teams of firms in their early stages of growth (pre-IPO)
undergo high turnover. Martin and McConnell (1991), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), as well
as a recent paper by Jenter and Lewellen (2011), study the links between CEO turnover and
acquisitions— which can be seen as a source of value creation, and often involve target CEOs
being either fired or forced to retire early. Murphy (1985, 2001) and Yermack (2006) document
the use of bonuses and severance in U.S. firms, respectively, and Kaplan and Minton (2008)
document the joint evolution of CEO compensation and managerial turnover in the U.S. over
the recent decades.
As we discuss throughout the paper, the existing empirical findings on managerial turnover
and CEO compensation in the literature are compatible with our model. However, the spe-
cific empirical predictions of our model of growth-induced turnover and its effect on managerial
compensation have not been subjected to direct testing— largely because the existing empirical
literature on managerial compensation, severance and turnover has not conditioned upon the
growth profiles of firms, either potential or realized, the severity of agency problems, and the
contractibility of growth opportunities. Our framework provides guidance on how these factors
are likely to affect compensation, severance, and turnover and thus may help in designing more
the arrival and quality of investment projects are only observed by a division manager who needs the headquarters to
finance the working capital.
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powerful empirical tests. Finding ways to control for these firm characteristics may be challeng-
ing, but in our view this should be feasible. For example, one clear prediction of our model is that
industries with better growth prospects should experience higher CEO turnover and use more
front-loaded compensation schemes. Then sorting industries into those that have and those that
have not undergone a persistent technological shock that creates opportunities for growth should
reveal significant differences in turnover experience and compensation policies. In a similar vein,
our predictions about severance pay may be tested by comparing the average severance paid to
departing managers in fast growing industries as opposed to slow growing industries.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our baseline model. Section 3
derives the optimal long-term contract, and provides an informal discussion of its main features.
Section 4 provides an illustration in the stationary limit of the model. Section 5 employs numeri-
cal simulations to further analyze the empirical implications of our model. Section 6 considers an
extension where incumbent managers have private information about the arrival of growth oppor-
tunities. Section 7 considers an environment where the firm can grow with its current manager.
Section 8 concludes. A mathematical appendix includes the proofs of some key results.
2 The baseline model
2.1 Setup
We consider a project that generates a stream of risky cashflows {Y1, Y2, ..., YT } over T periods
(we later consider the stationary limit as T goes to infinity). The project is run by an agent
(the manager) who is hired by a principal (the firm). The agent can underreport cashflows and
divert them for his own private benefit. For each unit of diverted cash, he gets λ ≤ 1, so that
λ captures the severity of moral hazard. In any period, an incumbent agent can be fired and
replaced by a new agent. For simplicity, we normalize the value of an agent’s best outside option
upon being fired to zero. Agents and principal are risk-neutral with discount rates ρ and r < ρ,
respectively.
The cashflow generated in period t is Yt = Φtyt, where yt is independently and identically
distributed with support Y, E(yt) = µ and min(Y) = 0, and Φt denotes the size of the firm at
the beginning of period t. Grow opportunities arrive stochastically over time. The state variable
θt ∈ {G,N} describes whether a growth opportunity is available (θt = G) or not (θt = N) in
period t. We assume the process followed by θt is independently and identically distributed, with
q ∈ (0, 1) denoting the probability of arrival of a growth opportunity, independent from cashflow
realizations. Taking up a growth opportunity involves costs from hiring a new manager and from
implementing value-enhancing transformations of the firm. Specifically, if a growth opportunity
realizes in period t, given an initial size Φt, the firm can grow to a size (1 + γ)Φt in period t+ 1
at a cost of (κ + χ)Φt, where κ > 0 and χ ≥ 0 denote the proportional costs of replacing the
manager and increasing the scale of the firm, respectively.2 If there is no growth opportunity or if
an available growth opportunity is not taken up, the size of the firm remains constant; however,
the manager may still be replaced at the same scale-adjusted cost, κ. Figure 1 summarizes the
timing within each period.
2When considering the stationary limit of the model as T →∞, we impose that qγ < er−1 to ensure finite valuation.
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The assumption (relaxed later in Section 7) that growth necessarily entails replacing the
incumbent manager is quite natural in circumstances where firm growth requires a new skill set
and/or a change in corporate culture. The incumbent manager, whose human capital has to
some degree become specific to the firm in its current form during his tenure, will have lost the
flexibility to adapt his skills to new requirements. While we have in mind drastic changes of the
firm, as a modeling convenience we capture this as a discrete change in firm size, which scales
up the distribution of cashflows. However growth in our model does not necessarily involve
an increase in physical capital. Instead, growth could simply be the result of finding better
management able to implement a permanent increase in firm productivity.
We focus our analysis on situations where it is first-best efficient to replace management to
take up an available growth opportunity, which in the infinite horizon limit of the model amounts
to the following parameter restriction
γµ
er − 1
> κ+ χ. (1)
Absent a growth opportunity, a manager would never be fired under first best when κ > 0. As a
benchmark, let Vt(Φ) denote the first-best value of the firm in period t given size Φ, ex-cashflow
and before the growth opportunity realization. The sequence of first-best value functions is given
recursively by
Vt(Φ) = q
[
−(κ+ χ)Φ + e−r {(1 + γ)Φµ+ Vt+1[(1 + γ)Φ]}
]
+ (1− q)e−r{Φµ+ Vt+1(Φ)}.
The recursion starts at VT (Φ) = 0, for all Φ, since at the end of period T there are no further
cashflows and the firm expires. In the infinite horizon stationary limit, the homogenous nature
of the model allows us to write V (Φ) = v∗Φ, where
v∗ =
−q(κ+ χ) + e−r(1 + qγ)µ
1− e−r(1 + qγ)
. (2)
2.2 Contracting
We consider optimal second-best contracting when cashflows are non-verifiable and the arrival
of growth opportunities is contractible.3 A contract is established between the firm and the
manager at the outset of his tenure. When the latter is replaced, the contract is terminated and
a new contract is established with a new manager. A contract specifies as a function of history
(i.e., the sequence of reported cashflows, and the history of growth opportunity realizations),
circumstances under which an agent is fired (i.e., history-contingent firing probabilities), growth
is undertaken, and non-negative cash compensation is paid by the principal to agents. Agents
have limited liability, and the principal has deep pockets implying that he will not pass up
growth opportunities because he is cash constrained. For simplicity, we assume a contractual
environment with full-commitment (no renegotiation) and we rule out private savings by the
agent.4 The amount of diversion is the only decision over which the agent has control. In
3Section 6 considers the case with non-verifiable cashflows and private information about the arrival of growth
opportunities.
4DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b), Section 2.1 and Corollary 1, show that if the rate of return available to the agent
is less than or equal to r (i.e., private saving is weakly inefficient), even if allowed to do so, the agent would have no
incentive to use private savings under the derived optimal contract.
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searching for an optimal contract, we restrict our attention to contracts that induce truthful
reporting (since λ ≤ 1 diversion is at least weakly inefficient). An optimal contract is one that
gives maximum value to the principal subject to providing a certain expected discounted payoff
to the agent, while satisfying incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints. We assume
that the contract is designed so as to give an expected discounted payoff of Φw0 to a manager
hired to run the firm at size Φ.
3 The optimal contract
In this section, we characterize managerial turnover, compensation, and realized firm growth
under the optimal contract. Our derivation of the optimal contract in Section 3.1 follows and
extends the approach of DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b).5 An informal discussion of the main
features of the optimal contract and its implementation is provided in Section 3.2.
The history of cashflow and growth opportunity realizations can be summarized by two state
variables: the current size of the firm Φ, and the agent’s size-adjusted expected payoff w. Given
this simplified state space, the optimal contracting problem is solved by dynamic programming.
To this end, it is useful to introduce a number of value functions (as depicted in Figure 1) to
keep track of the principal’s expected payoff at different points of time within a period, as a
function of the state variables. We let Byt (Φ, w) denote the principal’s value under the optimal
contract at the beginning of period t, before cashflow realization, given current size Φ and scaled
expected payoff w to be delivered to the agent; Bqt (Φ, w) denotes the principal’s value in period t,
after cashflow realization, but before the growth opportunity is realized; Bℓt,θ(Φ, w) denotes the
principal’s value conditional on a growth opportunity being available or not, before replacement
and growth decisions; Bct (Φ, w) denotes the principal’s value after the growth/severance decision
has been taken but before compensation to the retained agent, conditional on the firm entering
period t + 1 with size Φ; and Bet (Φ, w) denotes the principal’s value at the end of period t,
conditional on the firm entering period t + 1 with size Φ and with scaled expected payoff eρw
to be delivered to the manager as of the beginning of period t + 1. Our assumptions that
firm cashflows and costs are all proportional to size guarantee that these value functions are all
homogenous in current firm size.
Lemma 1. All value functions satisfy the following homogeneity property
Bit(Φ, w) = ΦB
i
t(1, w) ≡ Φb
i
t(w), i ∈ {y, q, ℓ, c, e}. (3)
The analysis is therefore simplified by applying dynamic programming directly onto the size-
adjusted value functions. In the end, an optimal contract is entirely characterized by a set of
rules specifying the evolution of the state variable w, and a set of policy functions specifying
the agent’s compensation and the optimal replacement and growth policies as a function of the
current value of w and of whether a growth opportunity is currently available or not.
5See Green (1987) and Spear and Srivastava (1987) for early applications of recursive techniques in the context of
dynamic moral hazard, and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a) and Biais et al. (2010) for applications involving time-
varying firm size.
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3.1 Properties of the optimal contract
In this subsection, we derive the size-adjusted value functions, the law of motion for the agent’s
expected payoff w (which following the literature we refer to as the agent’s promise), and the
optimal compensation, replacement and growth policies, proceeding by backward induction.
The recursion starts in the final period with bℓT,θ(w) = −w for θ = G,N . Then for t ≤ T − 1,
taking bℓt+1,G and b
ℓ
t+1,N as given, the value function b
q
t+1 is obtained from the maximization
problem
bqt+1(w) = maxwG,wN
qbℓt+1,G(wG) + (1− q)b
ℓ
t+1,N (wN ), (4)
subject to the promise-keeping condition qwG + (1 − q)wN = w and the limited liability con-
straints, wθ ≥ 0 for θ = G,N . The determination of contingent continuation promises wG and
wN in (4) is an important feature of the optimal contract in the presence of stochastic growth
opportunities. We describe the solution to this problem later in Proposition 2 after having
characterized the continuation value functions bℓt+1,θ in earlier periods (Proposition 1).
Taking bqt+1 as given, the beginning-of-period value function is obtained as
byt+1(w) = max
{wq(y)}y∈Y
µ+ E{bqt+1[w
q(y)]}, (5)
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of y, subject to the promise-keeping condition
E[wq(y)] = w, limited liability wq(y) ≥ 0, and incentive compatibility
wq(y) ≥ wq(y˜) + λ(y − y˜), ∀y ∈ Y, ∀y˜ ∈ [0, y]. (6)
The following lemma further characterizes the beginning-of-period value function, as well as the
impact of the firm’s performance on the agent’s expected payoff.
Lemma 2. The value function byt is only defined for w ≥ λµ. Moreover, given a beginning-of-
period promise w and cashflow realization y, the agent’s promise is adjusted as follows
wq(y,w) = w + λ(y − µ), w ≥ λµ. (7)
The agent’s continuation promise wq is increasing in the cashflow realization with sensitivity λ.
This guarantees that the agent has no incentive to underreport. Hence the incentive-compatibility
condition gives the slope of wq with respect to y, while the promise-keeping condition gives the
level of the schedule. The fact that byt is only defined for w ≥ λµ comes from the interplay between
incentive compatibility and limited liability. The beginning-of-period promise w needs to be
high enough to guarantee that even for the lowest possible cashflow realization, the continuation
promise wq consistent with incentive-compatibility and promise-keeping constraints remains non-
negative.6 Given byt+1, the end-of-period value function in period t is simply given by
bet (w) = e
−rbyt+1(e
ρw), w ≥ e−ρλµ, (8)
where the domain of bet follows directly from that of b
y
t+1.
6Recall that min(Y) = 0. More generally, the lower bound of the domain of by is λ(µ−min(Y)).
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Lemma 3. For t < T − 1, bet is concave in w.
In a Modigliani-Miller world, increasing the agent’s expected payoff would merely amount to
redistributing total firm value, and the principal’s value would simply be linearly decreasing in
the agent’s promise with a slope of −1. In the presence of moral hazard with limited liability,
a change in w also affects the principal’s value via its impact on the likelihood of inefficient
turnover. Under the contract, the principal is committed to firing the agent following a string
of bad cashflow realizations even though this may be costly (Proposition 1). When the agent’s
current promise is low, this ex post bad outcome for the principal is relatively likely. Increasing
the agent’s promise by one dollar actually costs less than one dollar to the principal as this
significantly reduces the prospect of a costly turnover. When instead the agent’s current promise
is relatively high, the prospect of inefficient turnover is already slight and the benefit derived
from increasing the agent’s promise is also small.7
3.1.1 Cash compensation
The value function bct gives the principal’s value contingent on the incumbent manager being
retained. The problem at this stage is to determine the optimal amount of cash compensation
to the retained manager. Given a current promise w ≥ e−ρλµ, the optimal mix of present versus
deferred compensation (captured by c and we, respectively) satisfies
bct(w) = max
c,we
−c+ bet (w
e) (9)
subject to the promise keeping condition c + we = w, the limited liability condition c ≥ 0 and
we ≥ e−ρλµ.
Lemma 4. Let wt such that b
e
t
′(wt) = −1. The optimal compensation policy is
ct(w) =
{
0, w ≤ wt,
w − wt, w > wt.
(10)
Therefore, bct(w) = b
e
t (w) for w ≤ wt and b
c
t(w) = b
e
t (wt)− (w − wt) for w > wt.
The optimal cash compensation to a continuing agent is determined by a basic tradeoff: deferred
compensation is preferable because it keeps the agent’s promise high and makes inefficient ter-
mination less likely, while early compensation is preferable because the agent is more impatient
than the principal. Lemma 4 states that it is optimal to defer an agent’s compensation until his
promise has reached the endogenous threshold wt. Naturally, the compensation threshold wt is
determined by comparing the marginal cost for the principal of present versus deferred compen-
sation. By compensating the agent with ∆c in period t, the principal’s value is −∆c+bet (w−∆c).
For a small ∆c, this can be approximated by bet (w)+∆c(−1−b
e
t
′(w)), which implies that non-zero
compensation is optimal if and only if bet
′(w) < −1, i.e., if and only if w > wt.
7In the mathematical appendix, we provide a proof to Lemma 3 which takes into account the impact of a change
in the agent’s promise w on firm growth, which was ignored in the basic intuition above. The key observation in the
proof of concavity is that at the next but last period before the end of the firm (period T − 1), in order to be able to
properly discipline the agent in the last period, there will be circumstances that lead to inefficient replacement. This
implies concavity of the value function bℓT−1,N . One can then show recursively that if the principal’s value function is
concave at one stage of the firm, the construction of the optimal contract guarantees that the principal’s value function
is also concave at earlier stages.
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3.1.2 Replacement and growth
We now proceed with the construction of bℓt,θ for θ = G,N . At this stage, given the realization
of θ and the manager’s promise w, the contract specifies the dismissal probability pt,θ(w), the
updated continuation value wct,θ(w) that the incumbent manager gets upon being retained, and
a possible severance pay st,θ(w) awarded if he is not.
The replacement decision takes into account the continuation value that the principal would
get upon replacing the incumbent manager. When there is no growth opportunity available
(θ = N), the principal’s scaled continuation value is
ℓt,N = e
−rbyt+1(w0)− κ. (11)
If instead a growth opportunity is available (θ = G), the principal’s continuation value upon
hiring a new manager depends on whether the opportunity is taken up or not. We restrict our
attention to situations where the cost of growth (captured by χ) is sufficiently small relative to
the benefit of growth (captured by γ), so as to rule out the uninteresting case where the firm
would never grow under second best. Hence the principal’s continuation value scaled by current
size is
ℓt,G = e
−r(1 + γ)byt+1(w0)− (κ+ χ) > ℓt,N , (12)
and pt,G(w) can also be interpreted as the probability of growing conditional on a growth oppor-
tunity being available.
The optimal replacement/growth and severance policies are obtained by considering the fol-
lowing constrained maximization problem, separately for θ = G and θ = N :
bℓt,θ(w) = max
p,s,wc
p(ℓt,θ − s) + (1− p)b
c
t(w
c) (13)
subject to the promise keeping condition ps+(1−p)wc = w, the limited liability condition s ≥ 0,
wc ≥ e−ρλµ, and p ∈ [0, 1]. To analyze this problem, it is useful to introduce for θ ∈ {G,N},
δt,θ = sup
w≥e−ρλµ
bct(w) − ℓt,θ
w
, (14)
and
wt,θ =
{
inf{w ≥ e−ρλµ s.t. bct
′(w) ≤ δt,θ}, if δt,θ > −1,
∞, otherwise.
(15)
Graphically, δt,θ and wt,θ are determined by finding the line of maximum slope relating the
termination point (0, ℓt,θ) to the curve representing the value function b
c
t .
8 The slope of this line
gives δt,θ, while wt,θ is defined as the value of w at the intersection/tangency point if δt,θ > −1
and wt,θ = ∞ otherwise. Note that ℓt,G > ℓt,N implies δt,G < δt,N . Furthermore, since κ > 0,
the slope δt,N is typically positive.
Proposition 1. For any realization of θ ∈ {G,N}, the optimal replacement policy can be de-
scribed as follows:
8See Figures 3 and 4.
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(i) if δt,θ > −1, the probability of the incumbent agent being replaced is
pt,θ(w) =
{
1−w/wt,θ, 0 ≤ w < wt,θ,
0, w ≥ wt,θ.
(16)
The agent receives no severance pay upon being fired, st,θ(w) = 0, ∀w < wt,θ, and his
continuation promise upon being retained is
wct,θ(w) =
{
wt,θ, 0 < w < wt,θ,
w, w ≥ wt,θ,
(17)
Hence
bℓt,θ(w) =
{
ℓt,θ + δt,θw, 0 ≤ w ≤ wt,θ,
bct(w), w ≥ wt,θ.
(18)
(ii) if δt,θ ≤ −1, the incumbent manager is replaced with probability one independently of the
agent’s promise, pt,θ(w) = 1 for all w ≥ 0. Upon being replaced, the manager receives
st,θ(w) = w, and
bℓt,θ(w) = ℓt,θ −w, ∀w ≥ 0. (19)
Proposition 1 shows that the two values wt,N and wt,G defined by Equation 15 are key
determinants of the optimal replacement policy. The value of wt,N < ∞ serves as the dismissal
threshold when no growth opportunity is available. If the manager’s current promise lies above
this threshold, w ≥ wt,N , then he is retained for sure, as indicated by Equation 16. If rather
the operating performance has been so poor that the manager’s promise is below the threshold,
w < wt,N , then he is at risk of being fired. In effect, he is given a lottery whereby with some
probability he is dismissed (although this is ex post inefficient) and receives no further payment
from the firm, or alternatively he stays with the firm and is awarded a continuation promise
increased to the threshold amount, wt,N . The probability of dismissal in that case is chosen so
that the lottery is fair (i.e., its expected value equals the agent’s promise w), and is therefore
decreasing in w.
When a growth opportunity is available, the dismissal policy essentially depends on how
good the growth opportunity is— which determines whether δt,G is greater or lower than −1. In
the case of modest growth opportunities, the logic of the dismissal decision is similar as above,
except for the fact that it is made by comparing the agent’s promise to the threshold wt,G,
which by construction satisfies wt,G > wt,N . In particular, an incumbent manager might be
retained despite the availability of a growth opportunity, and the probability of this happening
is increasing in the agent’s promise. When instead the benefit of growing is large enough (so
that δt,G ≤ 1), the incumbent manager is systematically replaced when a growth opportunity is
available, independently of past performance.
3.1.3 Contractual response to the arrival of a growth opportunity
We now close the derivation of the optimal contract by characterizing how the realization of a
growth opportunity affects the agent’s expected payoff. This involves solving the optimization
problem entering in the definition of bqt , as stated in (4).
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Proposition 2. For a given post-cashflow promise w, the contingent continuation promises
(wG, wN ) in period t are characterized as follows:
(a) If δt,G > −1
(i) if w < (1− q)wt,G, wG = 0 and wN = w/(1 − q);
(ii) if (1− q)wt,G ≤ w < wt,G, wG = (w − (1− q)wt,G)/q and wN = wt,G;
(iii) if wt,G ≤ w ≤ wt, wG = wN = w;
(iv) if w > wt, any combination of wG and wN such that wG ≥ wt, wN ≥ wt, and
qwG + (1− q)wN = w can be chosen.
(b) If δt,G ≤ −1
(i) if w ≤ (1− q)wt, wG = 0 and wN = w/(1 − q);
(ii) if w > (1 − q)wt, any combination of wG ≥ 0 and wN such that wN ≥ wt and
qwG + (1− q)wN = w can be chosen.
Proposition 2 describes how contingent promises (wG, wN ) are optimally set, subject to the
constraint of delivering in expectation to the agent his post-cashflow promise w. Part (a) of the
proposition, illustrated in Figure 2, applies in situations where the agent is not systematically
replaced when a growth opportunity is available. For low levels of the agent’s post-cashflow
promise, the promise is allocated entirely to the state of the world where no growth opportunity
is available. This is clearly optimal since a higher promise in the no-growth state reduces the like-
lihood of inefficient turnover, while a lower promise in the growth state increases the probability
that growth be pursued if a growth opportunity becomes available.9 When w reaches (1− q)wG,
keeping the agent’s promise in the no-growth state pegged at wt,G while allocating any marginal
increase in the agent’s promise to the growth state is optimal as the marginal cost of increasing
the promise in the no-growth state is equal to the marginal cost of increasing the promise in the
growth state— both being equal to δt,G.
10 Thus for low levels of the post-cashflow promise w,
the arrival of a growth opportunity is bad news for the incumbent manager. For higher levels
w, the continuation promise wθ is independent of whether growth is available or not. The agent
will be retained for sure, and by keeping the agent’s promise at w the principal equalizes the
marginal cost of the promise across the growth and no-growth states.11 Part (b) of Proposition 2
applies when the agent is systematically replaced upon realization of a growth opportunity, in
which case the marginal cost of an increase in wG is constant and equal to −1. Then setting
wG = 0 is always optimal, and strictly so as long as b
ℓ ′
N (w/(1 − q)) ≥ −1, i.e., w ≤ (1− q)wt.
We conclude with a couple of observations which follow directly from our analysis, by com-
bining Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1. For a given post-cashflow promise w > 0, pt,G[wG(w)] ≥ pt,N [wN (w)].
9In particular for (1 − q)wt,N < w < (1 − q)wt,G, allocating the promise entirely to the no-growth state remains
optimal so as to ensure that any available growth opportunity is taken up with probability one.
10Part (a-ii) of Proposition 2 implies that, conditional on surviving, the agent carries a promise of wt,G into the
compensation phase, independently of whether a growth opportunity realizes or not.
11Part (a-iv) of Proposition 2 shows that for very high values of w > wt, any (wG, wN ) such that b
ℓ ′
G (wG) = b
ℓ ′
N (wN ) =
−1 is optimal. Figure 2 assumes that wG = wN = w in that region.
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This first result states that, conditional on a given performance history, the probability of
turnover is weakly higher in the presence of a growth opportunity than in its absence.12 A
strict inequality holds unless w ≥ wt,G and δt,G > −1. In addition, we have the following result:
Corollary 2. There always exists an optimal contract under which the agent receives no sever-
ance pay upon being replaced.
Corollary 2 establishes that severance pay plays no material role in the optimal dynamic con-
tract.13 Positive severance pay can never arise in the absence of a growth opportunity, or even
upon realization of such an opportunity as long as δt,G > −1. Indeed in both circumstances,
part (i) of Proposition 1 applies. The only circumstance, although somewhat artificial, where
severance pay could arise under an optimal contract is if δt,G ≤ −1, and the firm has had good
recent performance so that the agent’s post-cashflow promise is above (1 − q)wt. In that case,
combining part (ii) of Proposition 1 and case (b-ii) of Proposition 2, it appears that the principal
is indifferent between giving a non-zero severance pay to the agent contingent on θt = G, or zero
severance and a higher continuation payoff contingent on θt = N .
3.2 Discussion of the optimal contract
Having formally derived the optimal contract in our setting, it is useful to summarize it infor-
mally and to discuss how it can be implemented in practice. The optimal contract between
the firm and its manager sets out the conditions under which the manager will be compensated
during his tenure at the firm and also those which will lead to his leaving the firm. These
terms and conditions are chosen to maximize the value of payoffs to the firm’s owners subject
to incentivizing the manager to truthfully report realized cashflows. Compensation and replace-
ment/retention decisions are made over time as a function of the value of payments promised
to the manager (scaled by current firm size), wt, which evolves under the influence of the firm’s
operating performance (a manager’s promise is increasing in the firm’s performance under his
tenure) and growth opportunity realizations. The contractual features in force in period t are
summarized by three threshold values— the dismissal thresholds, wt,N and wt,G, and the bonus
threshold, wt.
Since the replacement decision is made after the availability of a growth opportunity (or
lack thereof) has been observed, dismissal thresholds are conditioned on such opportunity being
available or not. The dismissal threshold wt,N determines the replacement decision when there is
no growth opportunity available. If the manager’s current promise wt lies above this threshold,
he knows that he will be retained. If instead the firm’s performance under his tenure has been
so poor that his current promise is below wt,N , then he is at risk of being fired with no further
payments from the firm. If he survives this, he stays with the firm and is awarded a continuing
promise that is increased to the dismissal threshold amount. The intuition for why there is zero
severance pay in this case is that by reducing the payment upon dismissal to zero the principal
12In particular, in the case δt,G > −1, part (a-i) of Proposition 2 along with Proposition 1 imply that when the
agent’s post-cashflow promise w is below (1 − q)wt,G, the probability of replacing the agent to take up an available
growth opportunity is equal to one.
13The analysis of Section 6 shows that this result hinges crucially on the contractibility of growth opportunity
realizations (Corollary 3).
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is able to increase the promise to the agent if he survives the dismissal threat, thus reducing the
agency problem faced by the firm subsequently. The probability of dismissal is chosen so that
the lottery is fair and is decreasing in the agent’s promise.
When a rather modest growth opportunity is available, the dismissal decision follows a similar
logic, although it is made by comparing the agent’s promise to the dismissal threshold wt,G, which
is higher than that without growth. Again, if the manager’s promise is below the threshold
wt,G he is given a fair lottery in which, if he is dismissed, he leaves the firm with no further
compensation, and if he survives, his expected discounted payoff is increased to wt,G. If the
manager’s promise is above the threshold wt,G he knows he is safe. Notice however that retaining
the incumbent in the face of a growth opportunity is inefficient, i.e., the firm passes up a positive
NPV project. A form of agency-induced managerial entrenchment can therefore arise in our
setting following periods of sustained good performance.14 When instead the benefit of growing
is large, the incumbent manager is always replaced for the sake of growth, independently of past
performance (wt,G = ∞). Conditional on performance history, the risk of dismissal is always
weakly higher upon realization of a growth opportunity than if no such opportunity materializes.
In any period, if the agent has survived the replacement phase, he may be entitled to cash
compensation, as determined by the bonus threshold wt. If the adjusted promise wt of a surviving
agent lies above wt, a bonus is awarded in that period equal to the excess wt−wt, and the agent’s
continuing promise is reduced to the threshold amount wt. Otherwise, if wt ≤ wt, the agent
receives no compensation in that period and continues with his promise wt, which is adjusted to
eρwt at the beginning of the next period as a fair compensation to the agent for his payoff being
delayed.
The promise that the agent takes into a period undergoes two adjustments prior to the
replacement and compensation phases. First, upon the report of the cashflow for the period, the
agent’s promise is adjusted linearly as described in Equation 7, the cashflow sensitivity being set
so as to provide the right incentives for the agent not to divert. Then depending on whether a
growth opportunity realizes or not, the promise is further adjusted as described in Proposition 2.
By allocating a given post-cashflow promise w between the ‘no-growth’ state (θ = N) and the
‘growth’ state (θ = G), the principal is effectively determining the probabilities of inefficient
and efficient turnover. In circumstances where the firm faces moderate growth opportunities,
when the cashflow performance has been poor and w is low, it is optimal to allocate the promise
entirely to the no-growth state, so as reduce the chances of a costly turnover while increasing
those of efficient turnover. Past the point where a costly turnover is avoided for sure, it is when
the marginal cost of increasing the promise in the no-growth state becomes equal to that of
increasing the promise in the growth state (due to a reduction in the probability of taking up
an available growth opportunity) that the principal starts allocating some of the promise to the
times where a growth opportunity realizes. For higher values of the post-cashflow promise, the
continuation promises are independent of the growth opportunity realization, as the agent will
be retained for sure and the firm will not grow in any state of the world. In circumstances where
the benefit of growing is so large that the incumbent manager is systematically dismissed upon
14This possibility (which only arises in our model when δt,G > −1) is in contrast with the result of Casamatta
and Guembel (2010) who find that moral hazard, combined with reputational concerns and managerial legacies, leads
to managerial entrenchment after poor performance. In a setting where managers privately observe shocks to their
productivity, Garrett and Pavan (2012) also find that the optimal contract allows some form of entrenchment in the
sense that retention decisions become more permissive with time.
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realization of a growth opportunity, it is always (at least weakly) optimal for the principal to
allocate the promise entirely to the no-growth state, so as to reduce the likelihood of inefficient
turnover.
The optimal contract calls for zero severance pay to a dismissed manager under most cir-
cumstances (in particular if a manager is not dismissed upon growth), and positive severance is
always at least weakly dominated by no severance (Corollary 2). Severance is suboptimal because
agents are risk neutral and severance payments have no agency cost-reducing benefit once the
agent leaves the firm. By reducing the severance and increasing the promise to the agent in the
case he is retained, the agent can be made as well off but the principal can be made better off
because the prospect of a subsequent costly liquidation is made more remote. Our zero-severance
result relies crucially on the assumption that growth opportunities are both exogenous and con-
tractible. We show in Section 6 that growth-induced turnover can result in positive severance
with risk neutral agents if the principal has to incentivize the agent to truthfully report the
arrival of a growth opportunity.
The optimal contract we have just described can be implemented fairly directly using standard
employment contracts, and there is some evidence that features of our optimal contracts are used
in practice. Our contract specifies an indefinite term with both the manager and the firm having
the right to terminate at will.15 Actual employment contracts are often written in this way.16
In practice, it is not unheard of that following a period of poor performance when the manager
was thought to be under threat of dismissal, the firm instead retains the manager and gives
him an improved compensation package as a vote of confidence. This is analogous to the award
of deferred compensation of wθ − w when the manager survives a dismissal threat. The bonus
calculation in the optimal contract is very much like the typical contract that was found by
Murphy (2001) in his study of the bonus contracts of large U.S. firms. The key parameters
he identifies are the performance target, the pay-performance-sensitivity (pps), and the bonus
threshold. In our contracts, these are µ, λ, and wt respectively.
Finally, our analysis implies that it is useful to distinguish two categories of firms depending
upon the quality of their growth prospects. The tenure of an incumbent manager will be heavily
dependent upon the type of firm he is running. A high growth firm is one that will undertake
growth any time it has an opportunity to do so, thus generating a lot of growth-induced turnover.
Other firms, which for simplicity we call low growth firms even though in practice they may grow
quite fast, do not always take up an available growth opportunity.17 While high growth firms
fully realize their growth potential, low growth firms optimally waste part of theirs. In the
face of a growth opportunity, a firm of the latter type will retain its incumbent manager and
forsake growth when the firm’s performance history under the manager’s tenure has been good.18
The reason is that when the manager has accumulated a high promised compensation, the cost
15Our setup could easily be extended to incorporate a positive reservation value for the agent. With zero reservation
value and limited liability, inducing the agent to remain in the contract is never an issue.
16Of course, some employment laws may constrain this, e.g., by imposing a mandatory notice period which may vary
with the tenure.
17Proposition 1 shows that the distinction between the two types of firms depends crucially on whether the value
of δt,G in Equation 14 is higher (low growth firms) or lower (high growth firms) than −1. In Section 4.3, we provide a
mapping of high growth vs. low growth firms in the parameter space in the stationary limit of the model.
18This result contrasts with DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a) who find that investment is increasing in the agent’s
promise because the return on investment is high then.
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of taking up the growth opportunity (which would include an expensive severance package) is
prohibitive. For lower values of w, the probability of taking a growth opportunity is decreasing
in w. That is, the better the recent operating performance, the less likely that the firm will take
up a growth opportunity.
4 Optimal stationary contract
We now consider our model in the stationary limit where T →∞. This is a useful simplification
because the key features of the optimal contract, adjusting for changes of scale as the firm grows,
will be constant over the life of the firm. This allows us to better understand the relationship
between these contract features and the deep underlying characteristics of the firm, in particular,
the severity of managerial moral hazard and the frequency of growth opportunities.
To do this, we solve numerically for the value functions and associated replacement, growth,
and compensation policies by iterating backward until convergence for a large value of T .
We assume size-adjusted cashflows are independently, identically and uniformly distributed on
{0, 1, 2, ..., 20}, with mean µ = 10. The moral hazard parameter is λ = 0.9. Discount rates for
the principal and the agent are such that er − 1 = 6.5% and eρ − 1 = 7%. The cost of firing
and replacing a manager is equal to 2% of annual mean cashflow (κ = 0.2), while the cost of
scaling-up is set to 20% of annual mean cashflow (χ = 2). We set the scale adjusted reservation
compensation for a new manager at w0 = 14. Other parameter values to be specified are q and
γ, capturing the likelihood and the magnitude of growth opportunities, respectively.
4.1 High growth and low growth firms
Our analysis in Section 3.1 shows that the optimal stationary contract is entirely summarized by
three time-independent threshold values wN , wG and w. Consider first the case where q = 0.1
and γ = 0.25. In this case, the optimal stationary thresholds are wN = 8.42, wG = ∞ and
w = 26.06. The fact that wG = ∞ indicates that it is optimal to grow and replace the agent
with probability 1 whenever a growth opportunity is available. That is, this is a high growth firm.
Figure 3 represents the corresponding stationary value functions. The fact that the value function
bℓG decreases linearly with slope −1 and lies above b
c for all values of w indicates graphically
that this is a case of high growth. The agent’s compensation threshold w = 26.06 means that
an agent who enters the job with an expected discounted payoff of w0 = 14 must experience a
sustained run of good cashflow realizations before receiving any cash compensation.
Suppose instead γ = 0.1, while all other parameters are kept the same. The optimal stationary
thresholds become wN = 8.42, wG = 18.06 and w = 33.29. Having reduced the rate at which
the firm can grow upon arrival of a growth opportunity, we now have a firm which does not
systematically take up efficient growth opportunities when available, and never does so if w is
above the threshold wG = 18.06. This is a low growth firm. Figure 4 shows the stationary value
functions in this case. Note that bℓG initially decreases linearly with slope greater than −1 and is
tangent to bc at wG = 18.06. The bonus threshold in the low growth benchmark firm is higher
than in the high growth benchmark (33.29 versus 26.06). Later when we simulate the model we
will see that on average compensation will arrive much later for the agent in this lower growth
case.
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4.2 Sensitivity of contract terms
The realized earnings and growth performance of firms are the result of managers’ and owners’
responses to cashflow shocks and to the arrival of growth opportunities, and these reactions will
be shaped by the terms of the contract as set out in the pay-performance sensitivity and in the
thresholds, wN , wG and w. Thus understanding how these thresholds are affected by changes in
the deep parameters of the model is an important step toward understanding how the earnings
and growth experience of firms is determined.
Figure 5 depicts the three thresholds as functions of the severity of moral hazard, λ, and the
frequency of growth opportunities, q, for a firm with a finite wG, that is, for a low growth firm.
The dismissal threshold in the absence of growth opportunities is given analytically by wN =
e−ρλµ. That is, the non-growth dismissal threshold is linearly increasing in λ and independent
of q. Intuitively, in the face of increased moral hazard, the principal will increase the dismissal
threshold, thereby increasing the risk of disciplinary dismissal.
Next consider the impact of λ on the bonus threshold, w. It is increasing in λ reflecting an
increased benefit of deferred compensation. This is because the inefficient termination threshold
is higher and the pay-performance sensitivity increases, implying that it takes a shorter run of
poor performance for the no-growth dismissal threat to be active.
An increase in λ also results in a higher dismissal threshold wG. This is beneficial to the
principal as it implies that the probability that the firm will take an available growth opportunity
increases, and in case an available growth opportunity is not taken up, the surviving agent’s
promise is reset to a higher level, w = wG, which makes subsequent inefficient liquidation less
likely. This also contributes to shift the distribution of promises to the right, making it more likely
that an agent’s promise will reach the (higher) compensation threshold, a necessary condition
for the initial promise w0 to be fulfilled.
We turn next to the impact of q on w and wG, again for low growth firm. A higher q causes a
fall in the bonus threshold, w, implying that cash payouts will be made following a shorter run of
good performance. This follows because, a higher q implies higher unconditional probability of
early termination, with no severance pay. Thus in order to deliver the reservation value, w0, ex
ante, the cash compensation needs to be paid earlier. Furthermore, for the same reason, in order
to increase the probability of getting to the bonus threshold the growth dismissal threshold, wG,
decreases because this decreases the probability of dismissal, conditional on θ = G.
Finally, for high-growth firms, by definition wG = ∞. The sensitivities of wN and w are
similar to those in the the low-growth case and for similar reasons. Again, in our framework,
wN = e
−ρλµ. The bonus threshold w is increasing in λ and decreasing in q, as is the case
for low-growth firms. w falls with an increase in q because the marginal benefit of deferred
compensation decreases as q increases. This is because as q increases it is more likely that a
growth opportunity will arrive soon, in which case it will be taken up for sure— and the likelihood
of inefficient replacement is therefore reduced.
4.3 What makes a firm grow fast?
Our baseline examples in Section 4.1 show that two firms that differ only in the size of the growth
opportunity will have very different contracts for top management. These differences translate
into very different policies toward growth opportunities with high-growth firms undertaking all
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opportunities that present themselves and low-growth firms undertaking opportunities only if
incumbent management is not performing well.
It is also the case that differences only in agency costs may result in very different growth
experiences. To see this, consider an example of two firms that have the same size of their
growth opportunities (γ = .125), the same probability of having a stochastic growth opportunity
q = 10%, and only differ in the degree of moral hazard λ. All other parameters are as in our
baseline cases. In this example, our model predicts that the firm with λ = 0.5 grows at an
average rate of 1.25%. This is because it is a high-growth firm that undertakes all the growth
opportunities that arise. Meanwhile, the firm with λ = 1.0 grows at an average rate of around
0.41%.19 Stated otherwise, suppose the two firms start out life with identical scale of operations.
Fifty years on (i.e., at t = 50), the expectation is that the firm with low agency problems will
have a scale (measured by the mean cashflow rate) that is 52% larger than the firm with more
severe agency problems.20
This holds for other parameters as well. That is, we may have two firms that differ only
slightly in their deep parameters, with one a high-growth firm and the other a low-growth firm.
Figure 6 depicts regions of the parameter space corresponding to high-growth firms and low-
growth firms. All parameters are set as in the second baseline case (low-growth firm) of Section
4.1 except for the two parameters depicted in the diagram.
To summarize, small differences in parameters can result in dramatically different growth and
turnover behavior. Growing firms need a sustained flow (high q) of good opportunities (high γ)
for improving their technology and expanding markets. They need to manage transitions well
(low κ, low χ). And they need to keep agency problems under control, for example, through
increased monitoring (low λ).
5 Turnover, compensation timing, agency costs
5.1 Simulating the model
We now simulate the model to understand its implications for management turnover and the
relative importance of deferred compensation. Simulations also allow us to assess the importance
of the agency costs due to the contracting imperfections present in this framework.
Specifically we draw repeatedly a sequence of cashflows and growth opportunity realizations,
keeping track of compensation, growth and termination decisions commanded by the optimal
contract. We then characterize these histories using a variety of summary statistics. We focus
on three statistics that are of particular interest. First we calculate the average longevity or
‘tenure’ of managers, which is inversely related to the replacement frequency. Second we calculate
the unconditional probabilities of efficient termination (i.e. fire the agent to undertake growth)
and inefficient termination (i.e. fire the agent without growing) as the corresponding realized
sample frequencies. Third, to measure the extent to which the optimal contract relies on deferred
compensation, we calculate the average duration of the agent’s compensation conditional on the
agent receiving non-zero compensation during his tenure in the firm. This is calculated as the
19The latter statement is based on simulations.
20Note that an improvement in corporate governance, if it induces a fall in λ, can potentially eliminate agency-induced
entrenchment.
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weighted average of the tenure years at which the agent receives positive payments, with weights
calculated as the ratio of discounted payment to the sum of discounted payments.
For example, consider the results for the benchmark cases given in Section 4.1. For the high
growth firm with γ = 0.25, average tenure of an agent is 8.6 years. The average probability of
efficient termination is 10% per year, reflecting the fact that for a high growth firm any available
growth opportunity is undertaken. The probability of inefficient termination is about 1.57% per
year. And the average duration of compensation is 7.1 years.
In contrast for the low growth firm with γ = 0.1, the average tenure is 109 years.21 The
probability of inefficient termination is 0.25% which is lower than the probability of efficient
termination (0.66%). The average duration of compensation is 20.4 years. Comparing results
for the two cases, we see that high growth firms receive compensation earlier on average than do
agents in low growth firms.
5.2 Comparative statics
In this section, we further explore predictions from our model in terms of its comparative statics
with respect to some key parameters. Specifically, we solve our model for alternative values of
these parameters and then simulate the model assuming the same realizations for underlying
cashflow shocks and growth opportunities. We record the histories of management turnover,
whether turnover takes place for growth or for disciplinary reasons, and the compensation his-
tories for each of the firm’s managers. The parameters we vary are q, the probability of having
a stochastic growth opportunity, and λ, the severity of agency problems. The default values of
these parameters take on when the other parameter is varied are q = 0.1 and λ = 0.9. Other
parameters are as in Section 4.1.
5.2.1 Management turnover
In our model managers are replaced either to facilitate growth or because a history of poor
operating results leads to dismissal. The exact conditions under which managers are replaced
are sensitive to both the growth prospects of the firm and to the severity of agency problems
faced by the firm.
Representing the quality of the growth prospects by the frequency of arrival of growth oppor-
tunities, q, we show the sensitivity to this parameter of average manager tenure. This is depicted
in the left panel of Figure 7 for a high growth firm with γ = 0.25. From the figure we see that
as the probability of growth opportunity in a year rises from 5% to 25% the average tenure of
the agent declines from 15 years to about 4 years. A similar negative sensitivity to increases
in q holds for low growth firms (e.g., with γ < 0.1), with the difference that, for a given q, the
average tenure is much higher.
Thus tenure falls and turnover rises for firms with better growth prospects. To our knowledge
this hypothesis has not been submitted to direct empirical testing. However, there is some
indirect evidence which is supportive of the hypothesis. Specifically, Mikkelson and Partch
(1997) compare top management turnover intensity in two successive five-year periods with very
21The model could be easily extended to obtain a more realistic turnover rate, e.g., by introducing stochastic death,
legal retirement age, or time-variation in managers’ reservation values.
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different mergers and acquisitions activity. They find that in the active take-over period of 1984-
1988, 33% of firms in the sample underwent complete management changes (i.e., replaced all of
the president, CEO and Chairman); whereas this intensity was only 17% in the subsequent period
1989-1993 when take-over activity was low. Interestingly their notion of complete management
corresponds better to our model which associates turnover and major changes of direction than
does most of the literature which has focused exclusively on CEO turnover. While they do not
specifically make a link of management turnover and firm growth, the two periods they cover
coincide with very different experiences of firm growth. On the aggregate level, average annual
total factor productivity growth in the U.S. was 1.35% in the 1984-88 period, whereas between
1989 and 1993 it was only 0.61%.22
In the right panel of Figure 7 we see the consequences of increasing the severity of managerial
moral hazard. As the rent extraction efficiency (λ) of the agent rises the average longevity
declines. This is a reflection of the fact that the optimal contract relies more heavily on the
threat of termination in the face of more severe moral hazard. A similar pattern is found for low
growth firms as well.
5.2.2 Efficient and inefficient replacement probabilities
As already noted, turnover may occur for growth or for discipline. These two kinds of managerial
turnover are affected differently by changes in the firm’s underlying characteristics. To distinguish
these effects, we calculate the average frequency of these two types of turnover in the simulated
histories and plot these as functions of q and λ in Figure 8. The top row pertains to the high
growth case, with γ = 0.25 as above. In high growth firms the unconditional probability of
replacement for reasons of growth are higher than the probability of disciplinary replacement.
Since all growth opportunities are taken up in these firms, this frequency increases linearly in q.
The effect of more severe agency problems on dismissal frequencies in high growth firms is
given in the upper right panel of Figure 8. Since all growth opportunities are taken up, changes
in λ have no effect on the efficient dismissal probability. The probability of inefficient dismissal
is slightly increasing in λ. This reflects an increased reliance on the termination threat when
moral hazard is more severe.
The sensitivities of dismissal probabilities for low growth firms are given in the bottom row of
Figure 8. As for high growth firms, the probability of efficient dismissal increases when growth
arrives more frequently, i.e., as q increases. In the right panel, the probability of inefficient
replacement increases with λ, reflecting greater reliance on the dismissal threat (increased wN ).
The decline in the unconditional probability of efficient dismissal, seen in the figure, comes from
a shift to the right of the distribution of promises under the optimal contract.
5.2.3 Compensation duration
To assess the consequence of changing parameters for the reliance on deferred compensation,
we calculate the realized duration of compensation from bonuses during agents’ tenure. These
sensitivities are given in Figure 9. From the top row we see that for both high and low growth
firms an increase in q reduces the duration of compensation. That is, when growth opportunities
22This is also reflected in the evolution of U.S. annual non-residential investment spending, which increased by 28%
and 12.5% over the two sample periods, respectively (based on annual U.S. National Income Statistics).
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arrive more frequently, firms optimally rely on more front-loading of compensation. The effect
works through the lower bonus threshold for both high-growth and low-growth firms.
The second row of Figure 9 shows the effect of increasing λ. For both high growth firms
and low growth firms the average duration of compensation rises as λ rises. The reason for this
is that a higher λ increases bonus threshold, w. Managers receive compensation only after a
sustained run of good performance.
Again, to our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that directly test whether these
effects on the timing of compensation hold. However, Kaplan and Minton (2008) find evidence
of an acceleration of CEO turnover since 1990, especially after 2000, a period that also saw very
rapid increases in the amount of top management compensation. They argue that the observed
increases in CEO pay are compensation for shorter tenure. This is consistent with our theory in
which high growth will be associated with shorter tenure and more front-loading of compensation.
5.3 Second-best value and agency costs
The second-best value of the firm in our framework can be computed as the expected present
value of all cashflows that accrue to the principal and to all managers who successively run the
firm under optimal contracts as set out in Section 3. Two subtleties should be noted in calculating
this second best value. First, cashflows to agents are discounted at the agents’ discount rate, ρ;
whereas, the firm discounts cashflows at rate r. Since ρ > r, the promise to an agent is worth less
to the agent than it costs the firm. Second, the calculation of agent cashflows includes payments
to all agents, both current and future. Thus in the stationary case we can write the size-adjusted,
beginning-of-period second-best value of the firm as
v(w) = by(w) + w + f(w), (20)
where f(w) denotes the expected present value of payoffs to future agents as a function of the
current agent’s promised value, w.23 To assess the extent of agency costs, the total value of
the firm under the optimal contract v(w) can be compared to the beginning-of-period, first-best
value of the firm, µ+ v∗, for v∗ defined in (2).
Figure 10 depicts firm value and its components under the second best optimal contact for
the high growth (γ = 0.25 in the top panel) and low growth firms (γ = 0.1 in the bottom panel)
as set out in Section 4.1. The left panel gives the value for the principal and the incumbent
agent, b(w) + w. The middle panel gives the present value of compensation to future agents
who are not party to the current contract but who are affected by the current contract and
the current promise to the incumbent agent, f(w). The right panel gives the sum of all these
components, that is, the second best value of the firm, v(w). In the left panels of Figure 10 we see
that for both high and low growth firms the combined value to the principal and the incumbent
manager is increasing and concave in the promise to this manager. This reflects the relaxation
of agency problems affecting the two parties to the current contract, and this is an effect already
seen in previous dynamic agency models. Interestingly, the total second-best firm value, taking
into account the effect on future managers, is not increasing and concave in w. This is seen in
the right panel of Figure 10 where, for both high-growth and low-growth firms, v(w) becomes
23The last term, f(w), does not appear in the earlier contributions to the literature on optimal long-term contracts
where there is a single agent and the ‘liquidation’ value of the firm is exogenous.
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decreasing beyond a certain point. This can happen because, as depicted in the central panel
of Figure 10, the present value of payoffs to future agents, f(w), is decreasing in the current
promise. In the case of low growth firms there are two separate effects. A higher promise w
tends to decrease the probability that the incumbent will be replaced for disciplinary reasons.
And it also reduces the probability of replacing the agent in order to undertake growth. Both
effects contribute to delaying the hiring of the next and subsequent managers, thereby reducing
the present value of their future compensation. In the case of high growth firms, by definition,
growth opportunities are undertaken whenever they appear, independently of w. Thus only the
first effect is present. This is the reason that the value f(w) is less sensitive to changes in w in
the high growth case than in the low growth case. Note that as w increases from 10 to 30, f(w)
declines by about 5 for the high-growth firm and by about 9 for the low-growth firm.
The second-best values in Figure 10 can be compared to the corresponding first best values
(µ+ v∗) of 260.4 and 189.4, respectively. Agency costs amount to roughly 5% of first-best value
for the high growth case and about 13% in the low growth case. That is, agency costs represent
about fifteen months of expected cashflows for the high-growth firm and about thirty months of
expected cashflows for the low-growth firm. In our framework, the total loss of value induced
by the non-contractibility of cashflows has four distinct causes. First, as in previous studies
of agency in a dynamic setting, under the optimal contract the firm will dismiss managers for
disciplinary reasons following a series of poor cashflow realizations even though this is ex post
inefficient. Second, there is an inefficiency due to the reliance on deferred compensation when
managers are more impatient than firms, ρ > r. Third, under the optimal contract the firm
will sometimes retain an incumbent manager and pass-up growth opportunities even though
growth is efficient under first best. This is the component of agency costs due to managerial
entrenchment, or ‘under-investment’. Finally, there is a more subtle form of agency costs, which
is due to the fact that at the time of agreeing a contract with an incoming manager the firm
does not take into account the spill-over effect on the timing of future managers’ hiring.
Specifically, if the current agent will be succeeded by future agents at stochastic stopping times
τi, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., the expected present values of the amounts they will receive, E[e
−ρτiΦτiw0], is
affected by the retention policy currently in place since it affects the distribution of stopping
times. In low growth firms especially, by not taking into account the value of payoffs to future
agents, the optimal second-best contract results in excessive retention relative to the optimal
constrained planner solution. As noted in the Introduction, this effect is absent in the previous
literature.
To get a sense of the possible significance of omitting this spill-over effect, we have solved
for the constrained planner’s problem, where the objective includes the expected discounted
payoffs to future managers. This can be done along the lines of Section 3.1 with the continuation
values ℓt,N and ℓt,G augmented by e
−ρw0 and e
−ρ(1+ γ)w0, respectively. When we do so for the
low-growth benchmark case above, we obtain a total firm value of about 188, i.e., just 1% less
than the first-best value and significantly greater than the second-best value. The main reason
for this large increase in value is that for the parameters chosen under the constrained optimal
planner’s solution all investment opportunities are taken up, i.e., with this change in policy the
firm becomes a high-growth firm. However, even when applying the same comparison to the firm
that is high-growth under the second-best policy, the improvement in firm value is noticeable.
It goes from about 247.3 under the second best policy to 258.4 under the constrained planners’
policy which is again less than 1% less than first-best.
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6 When growth opportunities are non-verifiable
In this section, we consider an extension of our baseline model where the incumbent manager
is privately informed about the arrival of a growth opportunity, i.e., θ is only observable by the
manager.24 This corresponds to situations where the incumbent manager knows what transfor-
mations could improve the firm’s future prospects, but is also aware that he would be unable
to implement these transformations himself. Analyzing the optimal second-best contract in this
extended environment clarifies the extent to which our no-severance result in Section 3 relies on
the contractibility of growth opportunities.
We are looking for the optimal contract that implements truth telling, i.e., under which the
incumbent truthfully reports not only cashflows but also the arrival of a growth opportunity.
The additional truth telling constraint enters in the definition of the value function bqt (w) given
bℓt,G and b
ℓ
t,N . Namely, we now have
bqt (w) = max
wG,wN
qbℓt,G(wG) + (1− q)b
ℓ
t,N (wN ),
subject to promise keeping qwG + (1− q)wN = w, limited liability wθ ≥ 0, and
wG ≥ wN . (21)
The inequality constraint (21) guarantees that the agent has no incentive to conceal the arrival
of a growth opportunity lest it should result in his dismissal. It should be noted that the con-
tingent continuation promises (wG, wN ) as described in Proposition 2 typically violate incentive
compatibility. Instead, we have the following result:
Proposition 3. When the realization of θt is only observable by the manager, the continuation
promises (wG, wN ) under the optimal contract satisfy
wG = wN = w (22)
for any given post-cashflow promise w, and bqt (w) = Eθ[b
ℓ
t,θ(w)]. All other aspects of the recursive
representation of the optimal contract are obtained along the lines of Section 3.
The principal would rather have set wG ≤ wN if the truth telling constraint (21) was removed,
hence that constraint holds as an equality under the optimal contract. An immediate implication
of Proposition 3 is the following:
Corollary 3. When only managers can observe the realization of a growth opportunity, the man-
agers of high growth firms (i.e., when δG < −1) are replaced with probability one upon realization
of a growth opportunity and receive a severance pay equal to their post-cashflow promise.
Corollary 3 shows that positive severance can become an essential part of the optimal contract
when growth opportunities are non-contractible. This is in contrast with the no-severance result
obtained in the baseline model (Corollary 2). Note however that positive severance pay only
24Effectively, the incumbent has private information about how the firm’s expected productivity under his tenure
compares relative to what it could be under new management. This feature is also present in Inderst and Mueller
(2010), and Garrett and Pavan (2012).
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arises in high growth firms. In low growth firms, dismissed managers leave the firm with zero
severance under any circumstance. It should also be noted that the optimal contract does not set
some fixed severance amount ex ante. Instead, severance is contingent on performance history
and increases with past performance.
We believe this result is particularly significant since in our model both the principal and the
manager have risk neutral preferences. As discussed in Spear and Wang (2005), it is reasonable
to expect severance pay to arise when managers are risk averse. Thus risk aversion and the non-
contractibility of cash flows would represent two distinct and potentially self-reinforcing reasons
for severance pay. The existing empirical literature on severance has not attempted to explore
these issues. The study by Yermack (2006) provides evidence that the payment of severance
packages to departing CEOs is a widespread practice. He interprets his findings as providing
support for a “damage control” view of severance pay (as a means of avoiding dismissed managers
making trouble for the firm under the management of their successors) as well as for “bonding
theories” of severance pay (as a means of providing insurance to the managers for their human
capital). One version of the latter theory is that of Inderst and Mueller (2010) who show that
severance may be part of the optimal contract to discourage managers from concealing adverse
information about their productivity. Our analysis suggests a related but alternative explanation
to why departing managers are paid severance in the context of growth. When the incumbent
CEO has privileged information about the creation of growth opportunities he might be tempted
to hide the news about a value-improving transformation of the firm that would require a new
manager. Severance serves to give him a stake in welcoming such growth.
To disentangle these alternative explanations, future empirical work will need to find adequate
controls for risk aversion, the contractibility or not of growth opportunities, the significance of
potential growth opportunities, and whether or not a growth opportunity was present when
severance was paid. At the firm level, sorting observed turnover cases into those occurring in a
growing firm and those absent growth should reveal clear differences in the frequency and the
size of severance awards. At the industry level, and all else equal, the corresponding testable
implication of the model is that fast growing industries should provide higher severance awards
to their departing managers than slow growing industries.
7 When the incumbent can grow the firm
Our analysis so far proceeded under the maintained assumption that in order to pursue an
opportunity to grow, the incumbent manager had to be replaced. In this section, we consider
an environment where upon the arrival of a growth opportunity, the firm can grow either with
a new manager or with the incumbent manager. Growth opportunities are contractible. The
analysis clarifies under which circumstances our conclusions from the baseline model hold, and
how they need to be modified in other cases.
We let χi denote the (size-adjusted) cost of taking the growth opportunity with the incumbent
manager, and χn the cost of growing with a new manager.25 The derivation of the optimal
contract follows the same logic as in Section 3.1, except for the construction of bℓG.
26 The key
25We assume that γµ/(er − 1) > min(χi, χn + κ), so that the first-best policy in steady state involves taking all
growth opportunities. Under first best, the firm grows with new managers if and only if χn + κ < χi.
26For notational convenience, we drop all time subscripts in this section.
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novel feature of the optimal contract in the extended environment is that, whenever the firm
retains an incumbent manager at a time a growth opportunity is available, it now needs to choose
optimally whether to grow or not. Formally, we define
b¯ℓG(w) = max
p,s,wc
p(ℓG − s) + (1− p)b
c(wc) (23)
subject to the promise keeping condition ps+(1−p)wc = w the limited liability condition s ≥ 0,
wc ≥ e−ρλµ, and p ∈ [0, 1]. We also define
bˆℓG(w) = max
p,s,wc
p(ℓG − s) + (1− p)[(1 + γ)b
c(wc)− χi] (24)
subject to the alternative promise keeping condition ps + (1 − p)(1 + γ)wc = w. The value
function b¯ℓG corresponds to the case where upon retaining its incumbent manager the firm does
not take up the growth opportunity. The value function bˆℓG corresponds to the alternative case
where, if retained, the incumbent manager does implement the growth opportunity.27 Note that
ℓG, the continuation value upon replacement contingent on θ = G, is generally defined as
28
ℓG = max{e
−r(1 + γ)by(w0)− κ− χ
n; e−rby(w0)− κ}. (25)
Whenever the cost of growing with a new manager χn is sufficiently small (relative to γ), if a new
manager is hired at a time a growth opportunity is available, growth is implemented (ℓG > ℓN ).
For high values of χn, the firm never grows with a new manager (ℓG = ℓN ).
7.1 When the incumbent never grows the firm
We start our analysis of the extended model by noting that under some circumstances the firm
will never grow with an incumbent manager and that in this case the results of Sections 3-5 go
through. Indeed if it is prohibitively costly to grow with an incumbent manager (χi very large),
a firm would never choose to do so and would only ever grow with new managers — as long as
the costs of doing so (captured by χn) are reasonably low. Our analysis of the baseline model
directly applies to such configurations.
Proposition 4. When χi is large, the firm never grows with an incumbent manager (bℓG = b¯
ℓ
G).
If moreover χn is relatively small, all the results of Section 3 apply.
7.2 When the incumbent sometimes grows the firm
In the remainder of this section, we turn our attention to situations where the cost of growing
with the incumbent χi is sufficiently low relative to the gains from growth, so that it can be
optimal for the firm to sometimes grow with an incumbent manager.29 Our next proposition
27Note that in that case, the probability of managerial replacement pG(w), which appears as p in (24), no longer
coincides with the probability of growing conditional on θ = G.
28In levels, we have LG(Φ) = max{e
−rBy[(1 + γ)Φ, w0]−Φ(κ+ χ
n); e−rBy(Φ, w0)−Φκ} and Bˆ
ℓ
G(Φ, w) is obtained
by maximizing p{LG(Φ) − Φs} + (1 − p){B
c[(1 + γ)Φ, wc] − χiΦ} over severance s ≥ 0 adjusted for current size Φ,
dismissal probability p ∈ [0, 1], and continuation promise wc ≥ 0 adjusted for expanded size (1 + γ)Φ. The promise
keeping condition is pΦs + (1 − p)(1 + γ)Φwc = Φw. The definitions of the continuation value ℓG and value function
bˆℓG, both adjusted for current firm size, follow from homogeneity.
29We focus on situations where bˆℓG > b¯
ℓ
G everywhere, ignoring situations that could potentially arise where bˆ
ℓ
G(w) >
b¯ℓG(w) if and only if w is above some threshold.
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describes the construction of the value function bℓG and the associated replacement and severance
policies conditional on θ = G in such configurations. Note that the value function bℓN along with
the policy functions pN(w), sN (w) and w
c
N (w) are obtained along the lines of Proposition 1, as
before.
Proposition 5. When χi is low, the firm sometimes grows with incumbent managers. Taking
the continuation value function bc as given, let wG ≡ (1 + γ)e
−ρλµ and
bˆc(w) ≡ (1 + γ)bc
(
w
1 + γ
)
− χi, w ≥ wG. (26)
The probability of managerial turnover conditional on θ = G is
pG(w) =
{
1− (w/wG), 0 ≤ w < wG,
0, w ≥ wG.
(27)
Severance pay conditional on θ = G is sG(w) = 0, ∀w, and the continuation value to the retained
manager (scaled by next period size) is
wcG(w) =
{
wG/(1 + γ), 0 < w < wG,
w/(1 + γ), w ≥ wG.
(28)
Finally
bℓG(w) = bˆ
ℓ
G(w) =
{
ℓG + δGw, 0 ≤ w < wG,
bˆc(w), w ≥ wG,
(29)
where the slope of bˆℓG for w < wG is given by δG ≡
bˆc(wG)−ℓG
wG
.
Proposition 5 shows that when χi is sufficiently low, if a growth opportunity arises after a period
of sustained good performance, the incumbent manager is retained and grows the firm for sure
(Eq. 27). If instead the recent performance of the firm has been relatively poor, the incumbent
manager is at risk of being dismissed. If he survives this threat, he is allowed to grow the firm.
If not, he leaves the firm with zero severance. Whether or not new management grows the
firm depends on their ability to implement the transformations that are required. If χn is high,
the firm installs the new manager but passes up the available growth opportunity. When χn
is relatively low, growth is implemented for sure, either with or without the incumbent. Note
however, that growing with a new manager is inefficient relative to first best when χn + κ > χi.
Figure 11 depicts stationary value functions bℓG and b
ℓ
N for parameter values such that Propo-
sition 5 applies, i.e., the firm grows with the incumbent manager if a growth opportunity arises
after sustained good performance.30 Threshold values are wN = 8.41, wG = 9.25, and w = 44.93.
In that example ℓG > ℓN , i.e., if turnover occurs at times a growth opportunity is available, the
firm will grow with its new manager. Moreover, δN = 0.77 > δG = 0.69, which captures the fact
that replacement is slightly more inefficient ex-post in the absence of growth.
To close the analysis, we characterize the adjustment of an agent’s expected payoff to the
arrival of a growth opportunity — which determines whether managers benefit or not from the
30Here we assume χi = χn = 2, κ = 7.5, γ = 0.1, q = 0.2, and the other parameters are as in the benchmark case of
Section 4.1, i.e., λ = 0.9, er − 1 = 6.5%, eρ − 1 = 7%, µ = 10 and w0 = 14.
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arrival of a growth opportunity. The next proposition is analogous to Proposition 2, accounting
for the fact that the marginal benefit of an increased promise to the manager conditional on the
arrival of a growth opportunity is typically increased when the incumbent sometimes ends up
implementing growth.
Proposition 6. For a given post-cashflow promise w, the contingent continuation promises
(wG, wN ) in period t are characterized as follows.
(a) for low χn so that δN > δG,
(i) if w < (1− q)wN , wG = 0 and wN =
w
1−q ;
(ii) if (1− q)wN ≤ w < qwG + (1− q)wN , wG =
w−(1−q)wN
q
and wN = wN ;
(iii) if qwG + (1− q)wN ≤ w ≤ (1 + γq)w, wG =
1+γ
1+γqw and wN =
1
1+γqw;
(iv) if w > (1 + γq)w, any combination of wG and wN such that wG ≥ (1 + γ)w, wN ≥ w,
and qwG + (1− q)wN = w is optimal.
(b) for high χn so that δN < δG,
(i) if w < qwG, wG = w/q and wN = 0;
(ii) if qwG ≤ w ≤ qwG + (1− q)wN , wG = wG and wN =
w−qwG
1−q ;
and (iii) and (iv) of case (a) apply for higher values of w.
The general logic that runs through Proposition 6 is the same as in Proposition 2, namely that in
the optimal contract the principal puts his promise to the agent where it counts most. Figure 12
illustrates this logic under the assumption that the cost of growing with the new manager χn is
low, so that δN > δG and part (a) of Proposition 6 applies. For the purpose of this example,
we take wN = 10, wG = 14, q = .25, and γ = .4. For low values of w, the entire promise is
allocated to the no-growth state so as to minimize the chances of a relatively inefficient turnover
in the absence of growth. However, once the post-cashflow promise w has risen sufficiently so
that wN (w) = wN , the agent will be retained for sure in the no-growth state. The concern then
becomes to avoid inefficient turnover upon growth, and therefore any marginal increase in w is
allocated to the growth state while keeping the no-growth promise pegged at wN . Finally when
the post-cashflow promise has risen to qwG+(1− q)wN , the incumbent will be retained for sure.
Above that threshold, any promise to the agent is delivered in the form of continuation promises
(wG, wN ) that equalize the marginal cost to the principal across the growth and no-growth states,
bℓ ′G (wG) = b
ℓ ′
N (wN ).
Figure 13 illustrates Proposition 6 under the assumption of high χn so that δG > δN and
part (b) applies. In this configuration, turnover when θ = G is most inefficient, and for low
values of w, the post-cashflow promise is allocated entirely to the growth state until it is sure
that the incumbent will be retained for sure if a growth opportunity realizes. Then for higher w
the incumbent’s no-growth promise takes on positive values, and so forth. Notice that in case (b)
where new managers are relatively bad at growing the firm, the arrival of a growth opportunity
is good news for the incumbent, in contrast with what we found in the benchmark model.
Together with the dismissal thresholds wG and wN , the updating of the agent’s promise
conditional on θ outlined in Proposition 6 determines how the probability of managerial turnover
is affected by the realization of a growth opportunity, for a given cashflow history. Figure 14
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exhibits dismissal probabilities conditional on post-cashflow promise and on the realization or
not of a growth opportunity. Note that in situations where the incumbent is at a comparative
advantage at growing the firm (bottom panel of Figure 14), for low values of the post-cashflow
promise, the arrival of a growth opportunity reduces the probability of dismissal. This is in
contrast with the baseline model (Corollary 1).
7.3 Numerical example
To conclude this section, we illustrate by way of a simple numerical example the turnover, growth
and compensation policies under the optimal contract, for the same parameter values as in Figure
11.31 The example illustrates under which circumstances the firm finds it optimal to grow with
the incumbent manager, and how managerial turnover is affected by past and current cashflow
realizations and the availability of a growth opportunity.
Table 1 presents the evolution of the contractual promise to the incumbent manager for a
particular path of scale adjusted cashflows and growth opportunity realizations. At the beginning
of the episode we consider, at t = 6, the manager is still running the firm at its initial size
(normalized to one), and has accumulated a high promise as a consequence of sustained good
performance. His promise wℓN is much higher than the dismissal threshold (34.16 > 8.41), but not
high enough to warrant a bonus (34.16 < 44.93). Thus he continues into period t = 7 carrying
a promise that has been augmented from previous period to take into account the manager’s
rate of time preference, ρ. A good cashflow realization leads to an upward adjustment of the
agent’s promise, and when a growth opportunity then presents itself, the promise is increased still
further. Given the high promise level, the manager is retained and is allowed to grow the firm.
Notice that his scale-adjusted promise is reduced (from wℓG = 42.75 to w
c = 38.86) to reflect
that in the future he will be running a larger firm and therefore will be facing a high expected
cashflow implying higher compensation.32 Subsequently, the firm is operated at a scale of 1.1
and following another good cashflow in period t = 8 the agent has accumulated a sufficiently
high promise to be awarded a bonus.
After period t = 8, the firm goes through several periods of sustained poor performance,
and the manager starts period t = 14 with an expected discounted payoff wy = 12. After
another poor cashflow realization, his promise falls at a low point of wq = 6.60. Inefficient
termination is looming, and case (a-i) of Proposition 6 applies. If a growth opportunity arrived,
the agent would be dismissed with certainty with zero severance; on the other hand, with a
contingent continuation promise wℓN raised to 7.33 the manager has a higher chance of surviving
the dismissal stage in case no growth opportunity arises, i.e., the most inefficient form of turnover
is made less likely. In our example, no growth opportunity arises in period t = 14, but the agent’s
promise is still below the dismissal threshold wN = 8.41, and therefore he is at risk of being fired
with no severance (with 13% chance). The challenged manager survives the dismissal threat and
finds his promise increased to the no-growth dismissal threshold.
31As noted above, under these parameters replacement is more inefficient ex-post in the absence of a growth oppor-
tunity (δN > δG), and part (a) of Proposition 6 applies.
32When the firm takes up a growth opportunity with an incumbent manager, his expected discounted payoff remains
unchanged. The adjustment to the promise, which appears in Eq. (28), is merely due to the fact that the end-of-period
promise wc is scaled by next-period size, whereas wℓG is scaled by current size.
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The firm performance in the next period (t = 15) is not good enough for the manager to be
sure to keep his position (wq < qwG+(1−q)wN = 8.49). Case (a-ii) of Proposition 6 now applies
since wq > (1 − q)wN = 7.57. If no growth opportunity had materialized in that period, the
manager would have been safe (wℓN = wN ). However, given the realization of a second growth
opportunity, he is again at risk of being fired (with 43% chance). The manager is dismissed and
leaves the firm without severance pay after a tenure of 15 periods. A new manager is hired to
run the firm at a size of 1.21 (indeed χn is relatively low, and it is therefore more beneficial for
the firm to take up growth with its new manager than passing it up).
To summarize the insights from Section 7, in our model extended to allow for the endogenous
choice of whether an incumbent or a new manager will grow the firm, we first find that when
the cost of growing with the incumbent manager (χi) are sufficiently high, we recover all the
results of the benchmark model where we assumed only a new manager is able to grow the firm
(Proposition 4). Conversely, when the costs of growing with the incumbent are sufficiently low,
then the incumbent may grow the firm, but only if his past performance has been sufficiently
good (Proposition 5).
8 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the relationship between managerial incentive provision and growth in
a dynamic agency model of the firm. In contrast with previous studies, we consider a long-lived
firm with stochastic growth opportunities run by a sequence of managers over time. In this
setting managerial turnover may occur not only to discipline management but also to facilitate
growth.
Our framework produces new insights on managerial compensation, turnover, and firm growth.
We show how optimal contracts in firms with growth opportunities can be implemented with
a system of deferred compensation credit and bonuses that are similar to those found in prac-
tice. Firms with very good growth prospects tend to rely less on back-loading of compensation
than firms with poor growth prospects. When growth opportunities are contractible, granting
severance pay to dismissed managers is (at least weakly) suboptimal under the optimal con-
tract because it has no agency cost-reducing benefit once the agent leaves the firm. However
growth-induced turnover can result in positive severance if the principal needs to incentivize the
manager to truthfully report the arrival of a growth opportunity. The growth trajectory of a firm
depends on the severity of agency problems as well as the quality of its growth opportunities.
When growth entails a change of management, growth can be forsaken after periods of good
performance. When instead incumbent managers are able to implement growth, they only do so
when past performance has been sufficiently good. When past performance has been poor, firms
grow with new managers. Finally, we identify a new component of agency costs which relates
exclusively to managerial turnover, which is due to the spillover effect of the length of an existing
managerial contract onto the present value of all future contracts signed by the firm.
Our framework can be extended in multiple ways to study more extensively how growth
opportunities affect managerial turnover and compensation. While in our framework the rate
at which growth opportunities arise is exogenous, it would be interesting to explore optimal
incentive provision when incumbents need to be given proper incentives to increase the likelihood
of growth. Managers may also need to allocate their efforts between producing cashflows from
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assets in place and developing new opportunities for growth. There may be a trade-off between
these two types of activities in that they may both require top management time but also because
they use different management skills.
Another possible extension of our analysis may be to incorporate time-variation in the arrival
rate and quality of firms’ growth opportunities, so as to better capture firms’ life-cycles— from
small start-ups to larger more mature firms. This extension may provide further guidance in
bringing the model to the data for the study of managerial turnover, CEO compensation and
firm growth, by distinguishing firms at different stages of growth.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Non scale-adjusted value functions are defined recursively as follows. Given
Bℓt+1,G(Φ, w) and B
ℓ
t+1,N (Φ, w), we have
Bqt+1(Φ, w) = max
wG,wN≥0
qBℓt+1,G(Φ, wG) + (1− q)B
ℓ
t+1,N (Φ, wN ), (30)
subject to qwG + (1− q)wN = w. Then
Byt+1(Φ, w) = max
{wq(y)}y∈Y
Φµ+ Ey{B
q
t+1[Φ, w
q(y)]} (31)
subject to promise-keeping condition Ey[w
q(y)] = w, limited liability wq(y) ≥ 0, and incentive-
compatibility constraint
wq(y) ≥ wq(y˜) + λ(y − y˜), ∀y ∈ Y,∀y˜ ∈ [0, y]. (32)
Note that the limited liability and incentive-compatibility constraints imply that Byt+1 is only
defined for w ≥ λµ. Now, given Byt+1, we can define
Bet (Φ, w) = e
−rByt+1(Φ, e
ρw), w ≥ e−ρλµ (33)
Next
Bct (Φ, w) = max
C,we≥0
−C +Bet (Φ, w
e) (34)
subject to C+Φwe = Φw. Note that the first argument in functions Bc and Be is the beginning-
of-next-period size, which has already been determined, and cash compensation C is not size-
adjusted. We can also define
Lt,N (Φ) = e
−rByt+1(Φ, w0)− κΦ, (35)
Lt,G(Φ) = e
−rByt+1((1 + γ)Φ, w0)− (κ+ χ)Φ, (36)
and
Bℓt,θ(Φ, a) = max
p,S,wc
p(Lt,θ(Φ)− S) + (1− p)B
c
t (Φ, w
c) (37)
subject to pS + (1 − p)Φwc = Φw, S ≥ 0, p ∈ [0, 1], and wc ≥ e−ρλµ. The homogeneity
result and the definition of the scale-adjusted value functions as they appear in Section 3.1
follows directly from the observation that in the last period BqT (Φ, w) = −Φw. Then given the
homogeneity of BqT , the homogeneity of B
y
T follows, and homogeneity of earlier value functions
obtains recursively.
Proof of Lemma 3: Our goal is to show how the concavity of bet arises for t < T − 1. For that
purpose, we need to go through the detailed construction of the value functions within period
T − 1. Our starting point is that in the last period byT (w) = µ − w, for w ≥ λµ, which in turn
implies beT−1(w) = e
−rµ − eρ−rw, for w ≥ e−ρλµ. Since the slope of beT−1 is strictly below −1,
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the solution of the constrained maximization problem in (9) involves setting we = e−ρλµ and
c = w − e−ρλµ. Therefore,
bcT−1(w) = e
−ρλµ+ (1− λ)e−rµ− w, w ≥ e−ρλµ. (38)
We can now analyze bℓT−1,N . The relevant continuation value upon replacement is
ℓT−1,N = e
−rby(w0)− κ = e
−rµ− (e−rw0 + κ). (39)
Note that w0 ≥ λµ implies that ℓT−1,N < e
−ρλµ + (1 − λ)e−rµ, which in turn implies that
δT−1,N > −1 and b
ℓ
T−1,N is piecewise linear and globally concave, with a kink at wT−1,N = e
−ρλµ.
The same characterization applies to bℓT−1,G if δT−1,G > −1; otherwise b
ℓ
T−1,G is simply linearly
decreasing with slope −1. Furthermore, note that ℓG,T−1 > ℓN,T−1 implies δT−1,G < δT−1,N .
Consider now the constrained optimization problem in (4). Given our previous characterization
of bℓT−1,N and b
ℓ
T−1,G, we know the maximum is reached (though not necessarily uniquely) by
setting wG = 0 and wN = w/(1 − q). Therefore we can write
bqT−1(w) = qℓG,T−1 + (1− q)b
ℓ
T−1,N
(
w
1− q
)
. (40)
This further implies that bqT−1 is piecewise linear and globally concave, with slope δT−1,N > −1
for w < (1− q)wT−1,N and slope −1 for w > (1− q)wT−1,N , with a kink at (1 − q)wT−1,N . We
now turn to the function byT−1 as defined in 5. Using Lemma 2, we can write
byT−1(w) = µ+
∫
bqT−1(w + λ(y − µ))dF (y), (41)
where F denotes the cumulative probability distribution of size-adjusted cashflows. Consider two
promises wA and wB greater or equal to λµ, and for α ∈ (0, 1), define wC = αwA + (1 − α)wB .
Note that
α
∫
bqT−1(wA + λ(y − µ))dF (y) + (1− α)
∫
bqT−1(wB + λ(y − µ))dF (y)
=
∫
[αbqT−1(wA + λ(y − µ)) + (1− α)b
q
T−1(wB + λ(y − µ))]dF (y)
≤
∫
bqT−1[α(wA + λ(y − µ)) + (1− α)(wB + λ(y − µ))]dF (y)
=
∫
bqT−1[(αwA + (1− α)wB) + λ(y − µ)]dF (y).
Therefore αbyT−1(wA) + (1 − α)b
y
T−1(wB) ≤ b
y
T−1(wC), and b
y
T−1 is concave. Further inspection
shows that byT−1 is strictly concave for w < (1− q)wT−1,N +λµ, and decreases linearly with slope
−1 above that threshold. The concavity of beT−2 follows directly. That concavity is preserved in
earlier periods can be established using similar arguments.
Proof of Proposition 1: We drop time subscripts for notational convenience. Taking ℓθ, b
c(.)
and wθ ≥ 0 as given, we consider the constrained optimization problem
bℓθ(wθ) = max
pθ,sθ,w
c
θ
pθ(ℓθ − sθ) + (1− pθ)b
c(wcθ) (42)
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subject to the promise keeping condition pθsθ + (1 − pθ)w
c
θ = wθ, the limited liability condition
sθ ≥ 0, w
c
θ ≥ e
−ρλµ, and pθ ∈ [0, 1].
One candidate solution consists in setting pθ = 1. Promise keeping then requires that sθ = wθ,
and the value taken by the objective in (42) is ℓθ−wθ. Other candidate solutions involve setting
pθ < 1. For wθ < e
−ρλµ, the set of possible value for pθ is bounded below by 1−wθ/(e
−ρλµ) > 0.
For values of pθ below this threshold, the promise keeping constraint and the constraints sθ ≥ 0,
wcθ ≥ e
−ρλµ cannot all be satisfied. Given pθ ∈ [max {1− wθ/(e
−ρλµ), 0} , 1) ≡ P(wθ) and for
0 ≤ sθ ≤ [wθ − (1− pθ)e
−ρλµ]/pθ, we define
f(sθ|wθ, pθ) ≡ pθ(ℓθ − sθ) + (1− pθ)b
c
(
wθ − pθsθ
1− pθ
)
.
The upper bound on sθ guarantees that w
c
θ = (wθ − pθsθ)/(1− pθ) remains above e
−ρλµ. Differ-
entiating f(.|wθ, pθ) with respect to sθ shows that the sign of f
′(sθ|wθ, pθ) coincides with the sign
of −1− bc′(wcθ). Lemma 4 implies that f
′(0|wθ, pθ) ≤ 0, and f
′(0|wθ, pθ) < 0 if wθ/(1− pθ) < w.
When pθ < 1, it is therefore (at least weakly) optimal to set sθ = 0 and w
c
θ = wθ/(1 − pθ), and
the objective in (42) is then equal to
pθℓθ + (1− pθ)b
c
(
wθ
1− pθ
)
≡ h(pθ|wθ).
Differentiating with respect to pθ gives
h′(pθ|wθ) = ℓθ − b
c
(
wθ
1− pθ
)
+
wθ
1− pθ
bc′
(
wθ
1− pθ
)
.
Whenever the optimal choice of pθ results in an interior solution, the first-order optimality
condition h′(pθ|wθ) = 0 is satisfied, which can be rewritten as
bc′
(
wθ
1− pθ
)
=
bc
(
wθ
1−pθ
)
− ℓθ
wθ
1−pθ
. (43)
Now, given ℓθ and b
c(.), consider the auxiliary problem
δθ = sup
w≥e−ρλµ
bc(w)− ℓθ
w
.
Graphically, this problem involves finding the value of w ≥ e−ρλµ for which the slope of the
line relating the points with coordinates (0, ℓθ) and (wθ, b
c(wθ)) is maximal. The first-order
optimality condition is
bc′(w) =
bc(w)− ℓθ
w
. (44)
There are three possible configurations.
1. For high values of ℓθ, such that ℓθ ≥ b
c(w) + w, then (bc(w) − ℓθ)/w < b
c′(w) for any
w ≥ e−ρλµ. There is no finite optimum and δθ ≤ −1.
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2. For low values of ℓθ, such that [b
c(e−ρλµ) − ℓθ]/(e
−ρλµ) > bc′(e−ρλµ), the optimum is
reached at the corner w = e−ρλµ and δθ > −1. In this configuration, Eq. (15) implies
wθ = e
−ρλµ.
3. For intermediate values of ℓθ, there exists a unique, interior optimum, and δθ > −1. In this
configuration, the value wθ defined by Eq. (15) satisfies e
−ρλµ ≤ wθ < w and
bc′(wθ) =
bc(wθ)− ℓθ
wθ
. (45)
Graphically, this condition says that the line going through the points with coordinates
(0, ℓθ) and (wθ, b
c(wθ)) is tangent to the curve representing the function b
c(w).
Suppose configuration 3 prevails. By inspection of (43) and (45), we see that whenever the
optimal choice of pθ is interior, it satisfies wθ/(1− pθ) = wθ, i.e.,
pθ = 1−
wθ
wθ
, (46)
sθ = 0, (47)
wcθ = wθ. (48)
The value taken by the objective in (42) at this candidate solution is
(
1−
wθ
wθ
)
ℓθ +
wθ
wθ
bc(wθ) = ℓθ +
bc(wθ)− ℓθ
wθ
wθ = ℓθ + δθwθ > ℓθ + wθ.
For wθ ≤ wθ, 1 − (wθ/wθ) belongs to the interior of P(wθ), and since ℓθ + δθwθ > ℓθ + wθ,
the solution to (42) involves setting (pθ, sθ, w
c
θ) per (46)-(48). For wθ > wθ however, setting
pθ = 1 − wθ/wθ would violate the condition pθ ≥ 0. The best choice of pθ < 1 in that case is
pθ = 0. Indeed, h
′(0|wθ) has the sign of b
c′(wθ)− (b
c(wθ)− ℓθ)/wθ, which is negative. Hence for
wθ > wθ, the optimization problem in (42) boils down to either setting pθ = 1 and sθ = wθ, or
setting pθ = 0 and w
c
θ = wθ — i.e., b
ℓ
θ(wθ) = max{ℓθ − wθ, b
c(wθ)}. Since δθ > −1, we have
bc(wθ) = b
c(wθ) +
∫ wθ
wθ
bc′(w)dw = ℓθ − δθwθ +
∫ wθ
wθ
bc′(w)dw
> ℓθ −wθ +
∫ wθ
wθ
bc′(w)dw
> ℓθ −wθ,
where the last inequality follows from bc′(w) ≥ −1. It is therefore optimal to set pθ = 0 and
wcθ = wθ.
Suppose configuration 2 prevails. Consider first values of wθ such that wθ ≤ wθ, i.e., wθ ≤
e−ρλµ. Recall that pθ must satisfy pθ ≥ 1 − wθ/(e
−ρλµ). Moreover the fact [bc(e−ρλµ) −
ℓθ]/(e
−ρλµ) > bc′(e−ρλµ) implies that h′(pθ) evaluated at this corner is strictly negative. The
best candidate solution with pθ < 1 can be written as per (46)-(48), noting that in the present
configuration wθ = e
−ρλµ. Since the value taken by the objective at this candidate solution,
ℓθ + δθwθ, is greater than ℓθ − wθ, this is the solution to (42). For wθ > wθ, the same reasoning
as above proves that it is optimal to set pθ = 0 and w
c
θ = wθ.
34
Suppose configuration 1 prevails. The fact that (bc(w) − ℓθ)/w < b
c′(w) for any w ≥ e−ρλµ
implies that for any wθ and for any pθ ∈ P(wθ), h
′(pθ|wθ) > 0. Moreover h(pθ|wθ) goes to ℓθ−wθ
as pθ goes to 1. It is therefore optimal to set pθ = 1 and sθ = wθ, for any value of wθ.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 summarizes the optimal solution in configurations 2 and 3, whereas
part (ii) describes the solution in configuration 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: We drop time subscripts for notational convenience and define the
function Vw(wG) = qb
ℓ
G(wG) + (1− q)b
ℓ
N [wN (wG, w)], where
wN (wG, w) =
1
1− q
(w − qwG). (49)
For any w ≥ 0, we consider the problem
max
wG∈
[
0,w
q
] Vw(wG). (50)
Note that V ′w(wG) has the sign of b
ℓ ′
G (wG) − b
ℓ ′
N [wN (wG, w)]. Consider first the case where
δG > −1 and wG < ∞, as depicted in Figure 4. For w < (1 − q)wG, V
′
w(0) < 0; indeed
wN (0, w) = w/(1 − q) < wG and therefore b
ℓ ′
N (wN (0, w)) > δG. Hence we have the corner
solution wG = 0 and wN = w/(1 − q). For w ≥ (1 − q)wG, the first-order optimality condition
V ′w(wG) = 0 is satisfied at wG = w. Indeed wN (w,w) = w, and b
ℓ ′
G (w) = b
ℓ ′
N (w) since b
ℓ
G
and bℓN both coincide with b
c in that range. Setting wG = wN = w is the unique solution
when w ∈ [(1 − q)wG, w] since Vw is strictly concave over that range. However for w > w, the
maximum of Vw is reached at any wG ≥ w such that wN (wG, w) ≥ w. This comes from the
fact that bc is linear over that region. Consider now the case where wG = ∞ and b
ℓ
G decreases
linearly with slope −1. This case is as depicted in Figure 3. For w < (1− q)w, V ′w(0) < 0; indeed
wN (0, w) < w and therefore b
ℓ ′
N (wN (0, w)) > −1. Hence we have the corner solution wG = 0
and wN = w/(1 − q). However for w > (1− q)w, the maximum of Vw is reached at any wG ≥ 0
such that wN (wG, w) ≥ w.
Proof of Corollary 3: By definition of a high growth firm, part (b) of Proposition 1 applies
for θ = G, i.e., sG(wG) = wG and we know from Proposition 3 that wG = w.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider the constrained optimization problem in (24). For given
w > (1 + γ)e−ρλµ, the objective function evaluated at the candidate solution p = 0, s = 0 and
wc = w/(1 + γ) is equal to bˆc(w), where bˆc is defined in (26). Note that the lower bound of the
domain of bˆc follows directly from the lower bound of the domain of bc. All achievable payoffs
are within the convex hull of (0, ℓG) and the payoff frontier bˆ
c.
Proof of Proposition 6: The argument of the proof relies crucially on the slopes of the value
functions bℓG and b
ℓ
N . Under the assumption that χ
i is low so that bℓG = bˆ
ℓ
G, we note that for
w > wG, b
ℓ ′
G (w) = bˆ
c′(w) = bc′(w/(1 + γ)). Then we apply the same logic as in the proof of
Proposition 2.
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Table 1: Illustration of the optimal contract when the incumbent can grow the firm.
Period t 6 7 8 ... 14 15
Size Φt 1 1 1.1 — 1.1 1.1
Promise wyt 30 36.55 41.58 — 12 9.00
Cashflow yt 15 13 17 — 4 9
Promise wqt 34.50 39.25 47.88 — 6.60 8.10
Growth option θt N G N — N G
Promise wℓt,θ 34.16 42.75 47.41 — 7.33 5.30
Replacement proba p 0 0 0 — 0.13 0.43
Promise wc 34.16 38.86 47.41 — 8.41
Cash compensation c 0 0 2.48 — 0
Promise we 34.16 38.86 44.93 — 8.41
The table illustrates the tenure of a manager under the optimal contract discussed in Section 7.2, for a specific sequence
of cashflows and growth opportunity realizations. Scaled cashflows are uniformly distributed on {0, 1, ..., 20}, with
µ = 10. Other parameter values are λ = 0.9, ρ = log(1.07), r = log(1.065), q = 0.2, γ = 0.1, κ = 7.5, χi = χn = 2 and
w0 = 14.
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✲Byt (Φ, w)
✻
Cashflow realization.
Agent reports cashflow to firm.
Bqt (Φ, w)
✻
Growth opportunity realizes.
θt ∈ {G,N}.
Bℓt,θ(Φ, w)
✻
Replacement/growth decision.
Bct (Φ, w)
✻
Agent’s compensation.
Bet (Φ, w)
Figure 1: Intra-period timing.
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Figure 2: Promises contingent on realization of growth opportunity: low-growth benchmark.
The figure is drawn assuming wG = 15, w = 25 and q = 0.25.
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Figure 3: Value functions for high-growth firm benchmark.
Scaled cashflows are uniformly distributed on {0, 1, ..., 20}, with µ = 10. Other parameter values are λ = 0.9, ρ =
log(1.07), r = log(1.065), q = 0.1, γ = 0.25, κ = 0.2, χ = 2 and w0 = 14.
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Figure 4: Value functions for low-growth firm benchmark.
Scaled cashflows are uniformly distributed on {0, 1, ..., 20}, with µ = 10. Other parameter values are λ = 0.9, ρ =
log(1.07), r = log(1.065), q = 0.1, γ = 0.1, κ = 0.2, χ = 2 and w0 = 14.
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Figure 5: Threshold sensitivities.
Scaled cashflows are uniformly distributed on {0, 1, ..., 20}, with µ = 10. Default values for λ and q, when they are
not used as variables, are λ = 0.9 and q = 0.1, respectively. Other parameter values are ρ = log(1.07), r = log(1.065),
γ = 0.1, κ = 0.2, χ = 2 and w0 = 14.
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The figure represent the threshold value of γ on the frontier between the high- and low-growth regions, for different
values of parameters λ, q and κ. Scaled cashflows are uniformly distributed on {0, 1, ..., 20}, with µ = 10. Default
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Figure 7: Average tenure in high-growth firms.
The average number of tenure years is obtained from simulating the optimal contract. Scaled cashflows are uniformly
distributed on {0, 1, ..., 20}, with µ = 10. Default values for λ and q are λ = 0.9 and q = 0.1, respectively. Other
parameter values are ρ = log(1.07), r = log(1.065), γ = 0.25, κ = 0.2, χ = 2 and w0 = 14.
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Figure 8: Average dismissal rates.
The unconditional probabilities of efficient and inefficient turnover are obtained from simulating the optimal contract.
Scaled cashflows are uniformly distributed on {0, 1, ..., 20}, with µ = 10. Default values for λ and q are λ = 0.9 and
q = 0.1, respectively. Top (bottom) panel is drawn for γ = 0.25 (γ = 0.1). Other parameter values are ρ = log(1.07),
r = log(1.065), κ = 0.2, χ = 2 and w0 = 14.
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The average compensation duration is obtained from simulating the optimal contract as explained in the text. Scaled
cashflows are uniformly distributed on {0, 1, ..., 20}, with µ = 10. Default values for λ and q are λ = 0.9 and q = 0.1,
respectively. Left (right) panel is drawn for γ = 0.25 (γ = 0.1). Other parameter values are ρ = log(1.07), r =
log(1.065), κ = 0.2, χ = 2 and w0 = 14. 47
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Figure 10: Second-best value for high- (top) and low-growth firms (bottom).
The components of second-best firm value are described in the text. Top (bottom) panel is drawn for γ = 0.25 (γ = 0.1).
Other parameter values are λ = 0.9, ρ = log(1.07), r = log(1.065), q = 0.1, κ = 0.2, χ = 2 and w0 = 14.
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Figure 11: Extension: When the incumbent sometimes grows the firm.
The figure represents the value functions discussed in Section 7.2 in the stationary limit. Scaled cashflows are uniformly
distributed on {0, 1, ..., 20}, with µ = 10. Other parameter values are λ = 0.9, ρ = log(1.07), r = log(1.065), q = 0.2,
γ = 0.1, κ = 7.5, χi = χn = 2 and w0 = 14.
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Figure 12: Promises contingent on realization of growth opportunity (case δN > δG).
The figure illustrates Part (a) of Proposition 6. It is drawn for wN = 10, wG = 14, w = 25 and q = 0.25.
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Figure 13: Promises contingent on realization of growth opportunity (case δN < δG).
The figure illustrates Part (b) of Proposition 6. It is drawn for wN = 10, wG = 14, w = 25 and q = 0.25.
51
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
post−cashflow promise w
tu
rn
o
ve
r 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
 
(1-q)wN qwG+(1-q)wN
pG[wG(w)]
pN [wN (w)]
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
post−cashflow promise w
tu
rn
o
ve
r 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
 
qwG qwG+(1-q)wN
pG[wG(w)]
pN [wN (w)]
Figure 14: Turnover probability as a function of post-cashflow promise, for θ = G or θ = N .
The top panel corresponds to the case δN > δG, while the bottom panel corresponds to the case δG > δN . Both panels
assume wN = 10, wG = 14, w = 25 and q = 0.25.
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